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GAMES JUDGES DON’T PLAY: 
PREDATORY PRICING AND STRATEGIC REASONING IN US ANTITRUST 
 
 
 
 
[N]o mere fact ever was a match in economics for a consistent theory  
(Milgrom & Roberts 1987, 195) 
Strategic theories of predatory pricing are pristine theoretical existence proofs 
(Elzinga & Mills 2001, 2493) 
We shall take into account of the institutional fact that antitrust rules are court-
administered rules. They must be clear enough for lawyers to explain them to 
clients. They must be administratively workable and therefore cannot always take 
account of every complex economic circumstance or qualification  
(then-Judge Stephen Breyer in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 
1st Circuit, 1990, at 22) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the Paul Samuelson Memorial Session during the 2010 AEA meeting, his colleague and friend 
Robert Solow recalled that, when challenged by a skeptical MIT engineer to state a proposition in 
economics that was true but not obvious, Samuelson named the principle of comparative advantage. 
What if he had answered “predatory pricing”, i.e., the proposition that by lowering price a firm may 
harm competition and consumers? Would that be a legitimate answer?  
That the notion of predatory pricing (PP hereafter) is far from obvious, and perhaps even 
counterintuitive, is a no-brainer, given that a price reduction is normally deemed beneficial for 
consumers and a sign of healthy competition. But is it also true? This requires answering two 
different sub-questions. First, is it possible that a price may indeed be so low that it harms 
competition and consumers? Second, is it possible that a profit-maximizing firm may rationally 
decide to charge such a low price?  
The MIT engineer’s reaction to Samuelson didn’t go on record, but even if he agreed that the 
comparative advantage principle was at the same time a true and not obvious proposition, he might 
have added a third requirement, namely, that the proposition also had practical relevance (which in 
that very case it clearly had!). In the case of PP, and assuming a positive answer to the previous 
sub-questions, this would amount to asking whether actual firms ever undertake predatory behavior 
 2 
and thus whether PP is a real world phenomenon or just a theoretical construct. That this third query 
is at least as relevant as the other two is apparent since PP has to do with a very concrete activity 
like antitrust enforcement. Indeed, the century-long, and still ongoing, debate about PP has always 
focused on all the three questions and on the different, sometimes conflicting, answers that have 
been given along the years by economists, law scholars and courts. 
The goal of the present paper is to focus on the most recent phase of the debate, namely, from the 
publication of the highly influential Areeda & Turner 1975 to the beginning of the new century.1 
This is an extremely interesting period under all respects – theoretical, legal and historical – because 
it witnessed substantial changes in the way the three above-mentioned questions have been 
answered by economists, law scholars and courts in the US. In particular, I will cast light on the 
controversial relation between strategic analysis and law enforcement: in a nutshell, when, how and 
why has modern game theory influenced the way US courts apply antitrust law to PP cases, if ever 
at all? I find this issue especially interesting not only per se, i.e., as a crucial ingredient in any 
historical reconstruction of the evolution of US antitrust law and economics, but, more generally, 
also because it may teach a useful lesson on the kind of features which make a formal economic 
model more likely to have an impact on the real world, via the reception of its main outcomes and 
prescriptions by real world agents like judges and courts. This in turn may help foresee the future 
pattern of antitrust enforcement by US courts, including the Supreme Court, especially on related 
subjects like the “hot” issue of predatory bundling. 
The content of the paper is as follows. The first section contains a summary of the pre-1975 
debate on predatory pricing. Section 2 deals with the first breaking point in our story, namely, 
Areeda & Turner 1975 and the reactions to it. The third and fourth sections cover the new game-
theoretic methodology and the related new PP stories developed after 1982. Section 5 is dedicated 
to whether antitrust courts should follow the strategic approach to PP. The sixth and seventh 
sections cover more strictly legal ground and deal with the second watershed in our narrative, 
namely, the US Supreme Court’s Brooke decision which in 1993 effectively barred the strategic 
approach. Section 8 focuses on a recent, and largely unsuccessful, effort to renew the courts’ 
interest in strategic predation. Finally, the ninth section takes on again the issue of why judges and 
courts have refused to “play the games” economists have bestowed them to investigate PP cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 I have covered the earliest phases of the debate in AUTHOR 2009.  
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§1. From the “wilds of economic theory” to a “meaningful and workable” rule 
 
“The predatory price-cutter is one of the oldest and most familiar villains in our economic folklore” 
(Koller 1971, 105). This folklore dates back to a couple of early 20th-century famous antitrust cases, 
such as Standard Oil and American Tobacco. Both cases featured a big firm, the villain in the story, 
charged of pricing down to a point where no competitor could survive, thereby becoming a 
monopolist. These and the other cases of predatory pricing (PP) fell either below the Sherman Act 
§2’s prohibition of monopolization or below the Robinson-Patnam Act’s ban of price 
discrimination.  
For more than sixty years, US antitrust courts dealt with alleged predation episodes applying a 
common narrative well captured in the following quotation:  
 
“The pre-1975 legal standard for predatory pricing hinged on two factors – unfair use of pricing 
power against new entrants or smaller firms, and protection of long run market competitiveness 
viewed primarily in terms of market structure. Economic efficiency was not specifically 
articulated as a legal policy goal. […] Unfairness was emphasized under the Robinson-Patnam 
Act, while structural competiveness was stressed under the Sherman Act.”  
(Brodley & Hay 1981, 765-6). 
 
Thus, the two basic ingredients of any allegation of predatory behavior had to be, first, the existence 
of the structural requirement of market power, and, second, the intention of unfairly exploiting a 
price reduction to increase or consolidate that power. Market power and predatory intent were the 
necessary features that antitrust courts had to detect in order to validate an accusation of predatory 
behavior.  
US courts went on for decades inferring predation from dubious proofs of market power and 
exclusionary intent. If both requirements were met, a per se prohibition applied, leading to the 
automatic condemnation of the alleged predator. No special consideration was given to the relation 
between price and costs, i.e., courts did not feel obliged to check whether the low price was still 
above the predator’s costs and thus whether the exclusionary effect – if any at all – could only work 
against less efficient, higher cost rivals, for whom such a price might well be below cost (see e.g. 
Kovacic 2007, 44). Condemning a firm for predatory behavior in that case would of course generate 
an anti-competitive, inefficient outcome, and would amount to a blatant protection of inefficient 
competitors, rather than of competition. Worse than that, an excessively strict enforcement of PP 
violations would risk, to use modern IO jargon, chilling genuine competitive behavior, i.e., either 
condemning or discouraging normal competitive behavior in terms of welfare-improving price cuts. 
 4 
Indeed, the ghost of killing “good” competition has haunted the whole history of anti-PP 
enforcement and has been the underlying argument of all its critiques.     
The traditional legal approach was challenged in 1958 by a young Chicago scholar, John McGee, 
who set out to establish two simple results: first, that by applying standard price theory it was 
possible to demonstrate that the classic story of PP was untenable, and, second, that a price-
theoretic assessment of the factual evidence in the most famous PP case to date, the 1911 Standard 
Oil, demonstrated that the condemnation of Standard Oil for predatory behavior had been largely 
groundless. McGee’s results laid the ground for the Chicago approach to PP, whose central idea – 
epitomized by Robert Bork’s classic presentation2 – has since then been that profitable price cutting 
is at best a very infrequent, and probably an impossible, business behavior. It follows that, in the 
words of another authoritative member of the Chicago School, “[a]ny attempt to administer a rule 
against predation entails a significant risk of condemning the outcome of hard competition. […] If 
there is any room in antitrust law for rules of per se legality, one should be created to encompass 
predatory conduct” (Easterbrook 1981, 336-337). 
  Despite being essentially fact-based, the most influential part of McGee 1958 was the theoretical 
one. What he and his generation of Chicagoans achieved was to establish price theory as the 
indispensable tool to check the validity of every story told by antitrust courts and agencies. In the 
specific case of predation, price theory provided a pair of good reasons why the usual stories were 
probably unsound. First, the observation that the predator usually suffered larger losses than the 
prey made it necessary for any dominant firm entertaining predation to have a “long purse” at his 
disposal, but, on the other side, also made it possible for any prey to resist predation thanks to the 
financial help of outside creditors or customers. Thus, no theoretical grounds could exist for a PP 
allegation, unless both the actual existence of the predator’s “deep pockets” and a specific reason 
for the prey’s impossibility of finding support in capital markets were explicitly proven. Second, 
high barriers to entry were also required in order to protect the predator’s recoupment phase from 
the possible arrival of new competitors or the re-entry of old ones. Again, the actual existence of 
these barriers had to be demonstrated if one wished to raise a convincing predation charge. Hence, 
price-theoretic analysis naturally led to an alternative story, one where PP was surely a rare and, 
perhaps, even an irrational strategy, so much so that price cuts and other allegedly predatory 
behaviors should always be considered as normal business practices, favorable to competition and 
market efficiency.  
Yet, US antitrust courts did not follow McGee & c. As it turns out, the 1958 paper, so often 
quoted and debated in burgeoning legal and economic literature, was completely ignored by courts 
                                                 
2
 See e.g. Bork 1978, Ch.7. 
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dealing with actual PP cases. Lacking an explicit endorsement by the Supreme Court, no lower 
level court dared raise doubts over the traditional legal stories and the attached per se prohibition. 
The loose standards of market power and predatory intent thus survived within a legal environment 
which traced the rationale for condemning PP not in protecting competition or promoting 
efficiency, but rather in defending a vague notion of fairness in the marketplace (cf. Brodley & Hay 
1981, 792).  
That fairness, rather than efficiency, be the real yardstick was apparent in the 1967 Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion in Utah Pie, not without reasons considered “the most anticompetitive 
antitrust decision of the decade”.3 Fairness dictated that defendants in that case had to be convicted 
for price predation. Despite its being the leader in the Salt Lake City market of dessert pies, the 
single-plant, family-owned business Utah Pie deserved antitrust protection from the competition of 
the defendants, three big food conglomerates whose prices in Salt Lake City were lower than in the 
rest of the country, precisely because the latter were big food conglomerates, while the plaintiff was 
a family-owned business! As the dissenting Justice Stewart put it, the decision entailed that “…Utah 
Pie’s monopolistic position was protected by the federal antitrust laws from effective price 
competition” (Utah Pie, at 706): the archetype of using antitrust law to defend a competitor, rather 
than competition.  
Utah Pie is just the most prominent example of how US courts went on mishandling PP cases 
during the 1960s and 1970s, by still focusing on vague notions of “harm to competitors”, “predatory 
intent” and “ruinous competition”, while paying little attention to efficiency issues. Another 
Supreme Court’s decision mirroring the same legal attitude came one year earlier, in the Grinnell  
case.4 There the Court declared that Sherman Act §2 violations required two elements, namely, the 
possession of monopoly power and <<…the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.>> (Grinnell, at 570-1). Again, a vague notion of “willfulness” was 
crucially called into play. If, as customary, we take “willful” as synonymous of “intentional”, it is 
hardly surprising that the application of the Grinnell dictum has caused troubles to US courts since 
then: indeed, every firm willfully acquires or maintains its market power, that is to say, even when it 
does so via “business acumen” or a “superior product” (Werden 2009, 68-9).  
Both Grinnell, with its focus on intent, and Utah Pie, with its emphasis on the defense of 
competitors rather than competition, were symptomatic of the distance separating that branch of 
antitrust law from proper economic analysis. To cap all that, came the Topco decision,5 where the 
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 Utah Pie v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). The negative judgment is in Bowman 1975 [1967], 455. 
4
 United States v. Grinnell Corp, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
5
 United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 US 596 (1972). 
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Supreme Court put on paper a real anathema against theoretical economics: <<Should Congress 
ultimately determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make 
per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of 
economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach.>> (Topco, 612, emphasis added). This 
jurisprudential attitude led to a very high percentage of convictions in predatory cases at federal 
courts level. According to Bolton et al. (2000, 2253), until the mid-1970s three out of four PP trials 
at federal level ended with the defendant’s conviction.6  
Such an outcome was matched in the same period by US federal agencies’ aggressive behavior 
against price cuts made by dominant firms. As it turns out, the Department of Justice did not 
hesitate to bring criminal charges against alleged predators during the whole 1960s; still in 1977 the 
US Attorney General could announce in a public address his willingness to undertake criminal 
enforcement against PP aimed at destroying competitors.7 Hence, it must be recognized that the 
traditional hostility of US antitrust courts and agencies against those price cuts made by dominant 
firms remained untouched well into the 1970s, as if McGee 1958 had never been written.8  
 Yet, McGee 1958 had been written, and, following it, also a whole bunch of new economic 
literature where, by making explicit use of price theory, either McGee’s results had been 
strengthened or the possible rationality of predatory behavior had been defended in much sounder 
terms than those used by US courts, that is to say, via the development of theoretically sophisticated 
stories which showed that predation might well be profitable.9 To the eyes of those scholars who 
did believe that PP potentially was a serious offense, but who, at the same time, did not want the per 
se illegality of predation to turn into a de facto prohibition of every legitimate kind of price 
competition, the situation in the early 1970s was troublesome. On the one side, we had a populist 
application of the PP offense by antitrust courts, founded upon very weak legal stories which had 
led to a list of wrong or, at least, very debatable rulings; on the other, we had several price-theoretic 
stories whose implications ranged from Chicago’s suggested abolition of the predatory offense to 
the requirement that courts be capable of verifying the applicability of one of those sophisticated 
stories where PP actually turned out being rational business behavior – a requirement whose 
obvious consequence was to increase the risk of legal mistakes by courts unable “to ramble through 
the wilds of economic theory”. 
                                                 
6
 In an oft-quoted study, Koller 1975 [1971] listed 123 federal PP cases, of which 95 had ended with the condemnation 
of the predator. 
7
 Attorney General Griffin Bell, quoted by Kovacic 2007, 45. 
8
 The first decision by a US court ever to mention McGee 1958 has been Matsushita in 1986, on which see below, §6. 
9
 This literature is analyzed in AUTHOR 2009. 
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The deadlock was broken by two Harvard law scholars, Donald F. Turner and Phillip E. Areeda, 
who published a paper in the 1975 Harvard Law Review which became an instant classic.10 The 
main idea what that, rather than struggling to reconstruct the plausibility of one or the other 
predatory stories available in the literature, courts should be required to apply a straightforward rule 
and then draw the consequences of the result. Thus, in place of a complex and increasingly 
controversial doctrine, Areeda & Turner suggested a simple, bright-line principle, directly derived 
from basic price theory. The rule was designed to be discriminatory enough to allow the 
identification of real predatory behavior and avoid the risk of chilling genuine competition. In the 
authors’ words, <<[i]n this paper we will attempt to formulate meaningful and workable tests for 
distinguishing between predatory and competitive pricing by examining the relationship between a 
firm’s costs and its prices.>> (Areeda & Turner 1975, 699-700). Thus, their rule aimed, on the one 
side, at giving a specific content to the otherwise generic and arbitrary expression “below cost 
pricing” which was often encountered in PP cases and, on the other, at being “meaningful and 
workable”, i.e., easily applicable by a court. As I argue in more detail below (see §7.1), the latter 
goal constitutes the trademark of the Harvard approach to antitrust. As Justice Breyer put it in his 
tribute to Donald Turner, Turner’s <<basic point of view>> was that <<[a]ntitrust policy cannot rest 
upon a laundry list of fifty or a hundred different factors.>>. In order to achieve its main goal, 
namely, the protection of the competitive process, law enforcement had rather to be based on 
<<…soundly based rules using a few key factors that bench and bar can understand and that courts 
and agencies can administer.>> (Breyer 1996, 726).    
But which of the various notions of cost should become the threshold value for the new rule? In 
Areeda & Turner’s short run, static, linear cost model, the answer came directly from price theory: 
the relevant notion had to be marginal cost. Hence, no price equal or greater than short run marginal 
cost could ever be considered predatory, while any price below that level should be presumed 
predatory (ibid., 711-2).11 Yet, this version of the rule clashed with the authors’ operational 
purpose: actual courts would in fact find themselves in troubles if called to estimate a firm’s 
marginal cost. Keeping in mind their goal of being “meaningful and workable”, Areeda & Turner 
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 At the time Donald Turner was still the leading figure of the duo: a Harvard PhD in economics (in 1947) and law 
professor from 1954 to 1979, he authored with Carl Kaysen an influential handbook on antitrust law and economics 
(Kaysen & Turner 1959) and headed the Antitrust Division in the US Department of Justice from 1965 to 1969, where 
he created the position of Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, the top job in US federal 
administration for an antitrust economist. With Phillip Areeda (another Harvard law professor and outstanding antitrust 
scholar), he also authored the monumental Areeda & Turner 1978. Details on Areeda and Turner’s lives and 
contributions can be found in the Winter 1996 memorial issue of the Antitrust Bulletin. 
11
 Note that the rule directly aimed at distinguishing pro-efficiency from anti-efficiency price cuts (every price below 
marginal cost being necessarily welfare-reducing), but neglected the issues of whether predation was profitable and 
whether it was a real world phenomenon (our second and third questions in the Introduction). In other words, Areeda & 
Turner 1975 took it for granted that the court had an adequate reason to undertake the inquiry and apply the rule. See on 
this Easterbrook 1981, 276. 
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offered as a solution to replace in actual litigations marginal cost with a proxy, average variable 
cost (AVC). Hence, the final version of Areeda & Turner rule (ATR henceforth) sounded like this:  
 
“… we conclude that: (a) A price at or above reasonably anticipated average variable cost 
should be conclusively presumed lawful. (b) A price below reasonably anticipated average 
variable cost should be conclusively presumed unlawful.” (ibid., 733).  
 
It was in this version that, to paraphrase Keynes’s famous dictum, the ATR “conquered [US 
courts] as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain” (Keynes 1973 [1936], 32). 
And it is from this conquest that our narrative proceeds.  
 
 
§2. Playing by the rule 
 
2.1 It is hard to say whether the ATR had a larger effect on US antitrust courts or on antitrust 
literature, as in both cases it was a huge one. As far as courts are concerned, the ATR is a rare 
instance of an economic idea which immediately and significantly affected law enforcement. The 
rule radically changed the courts’ attitude towards PP: from a percentage of victories in PP 
litigations of over 75% (as calculated by Koller 1975 [1971]), plaintiffs’ success rate fell to less 
than 20% in the period 1975-1993, and in particular to 0% in the five years immediately following 
the publication of Areeda and Turner’s paper – that is to say, no plaintiff’s victory in PP cases went 
on record in 1975-1980.12 Just to mention a few more data,  Areeda & Turner 1975 has been quoted 
by more than 100 antitrust courts between 1975 and 2000,13 and six of these courts did not even let 
the Harvard Law Review’s ink dry before applying the new rule, as they did so between early 1975 
and mid-1977!14 Thus, it is an euphemism to say that ATR was swiftly embraced by US courts and 
it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the rule created a situation of de facto per se lawfulness of 
every price cut, turning PP litigations, as a commentator put it, into “a defendant’s paradise” 
(Williamson 1977, 305).  
Why did US courts so eagerly endorse the ATR? A preliminary answer at this stage of the paper 
may be found in the above-mentioned dire straits of PP enforcement in the late 1960s - early 1970s. 
Attacked by many fronts for the theoretical weakness – if not outright inconsistency – of the stories 
behind their application of antitrust law to PP cases, courts seemed all too happy to adopt a simple, 
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 See Bolton et al. 2000, 2253-4. 
13
 Actually, 109 times out of the 448 significant PP cases in the same period (the term “significant” meaning those cases 
where predation is referred to in the case overview or core terms). The pct. of hits is a striking 24%! Source: Lexis. 
14
 The rule immediately affected the DOJ as well: already in 1976 the Department dismissed one big antitrust case 
precisely because it fell short of satisfying the marginal/average variable cost test: see Williamson 1977, 285, fn.5.    
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highly operational rule which exhibited the prestigious label of price theory, itself a warranty that, 
apart from material mistakes in calculating prices and costs, no decision based on it could ever be 
accused of being devoid of solid theoretical foundations. Hence, the immediate success of ATR 
revealed a clear preference by antitrust courts for rule-based decisions over story-based ones.15 
 
2.2 The ATR impact on the literature was, if possible, even stronger and faster than in courts. A 
fierce debate was instantaneously sparkled by Areeda & Turner’s paper, with big names involved, 
such as Mike Scherer, Richard Posner, Oliver Williamson, Robert Bork, Dick Schmalensee, Alvin 
Klevorick and William Baumol, all of whom published relevant contributions between 1976 and 
1979.16  These were followed in the next couple of years by survey articles on PP theory and policy, 
such as McGee 1980, Brodley & Hay 1981 and Easterbrook 1981. It goes beyond the limits of the 
present paper to analyze this post-ATR literature in detail. Thus, I will just single out its main 
threads and outcomes. 
As far as the former are concerned, two major issues were tackled. First of all, the rule vs. story 
dichotomy, as some of the contributors, though critic of Areeda and Turner’s specific solution, 
embraced their overall goal of achieving a “meaningful and workable” rule capable of replacing all 
the dubious predatory stories told by pre-1975 courts. On the contrary, other participants to the 
debate were against what they considered a gross simplification of not-so-simple an issue, and 
pressed hard for a return to a story-based approach, i.e., in antitrust jargon, for making recourse to a 
full rule of reason inquiry. A third position was held by those scholars who argued that PP was 
hardly an issue at all and thus were in a sense neutral with respect to the rules vs. stories debate as 
they believed that every rule or story, if rigorous enough, would inevitably reveal that predation 
could never be rational business behavior.  
The champion of the rule of reason approach was Mike Scherer who also happened to be the first 
to react against Areeda & Turner’s paper. This is remarkable because Scherer also came from 
Harvard University, so what we have here is an instance of an Harvard antitrust economists 
dismissing an argument by two prominent Harvard antitrust lawyers. Maybe the infeud also had to 
do with the defense of the economists’ own territory,17 but the main reason behind it was Scherer’s 
prescience of the inevitable outcome of ATR in courts, namely, the de facto legalization of every 
price cut by market leaders – something no supporter of Harvard’s structure-conduct performance 
mantra could digest. Hence, he argued that it was both unrealistic and analytically wrong to apply a 
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 We will return to this issue below, §7. 
16
 Scherer 1976; Posner 1976, Ch.7, and 1979; Williamson 1977; Bork 1978, Ch.7; Schmalensee 1979; Joskow & 
Klevorick 1979; Baumol 1979. Remarkably, most of this literature appeared in law, not economics, journals. 
17
 Indeed Scherer began his attack by harshly complaining that Areeda and Turner simply did not know price theory 
enough to offer a rigorous argument (Scherer 1976, 869).  
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simple short-run price cost rule for assessing whether a price be socially undesirable and predatory. 
Only a complete examination of facts, intent and market structure18 – i.e. a full-blown rule of reason 
methodology – could save courts from making wrong decisions. 
In their reply, Areeda and Turner pointed out that long run welfare effects – of the kind which had 
to be evaluated for applying the rule of reason – are intrinsically speculative and indeterminate, so 
much so that no suitable administrable rules could be formulated to give them recognition. 
Scherer’s checklist of relevant features to be assessed in order to validate a price cut could not be 
realistically used either ex ante by a monopolist wishing to determine the legal floor for its pricing 
policy or ex post by a court. Hence, in the very spirit of their 1975 paper, they concluded that 
<<Scherer’s constructs for determining what price will maximize long-run welfare have no 
operational utility for antitrust law purposes. […] We adhere to our position that a test which is 
reasonably determinable and which plainly maximizes short-run welfare is the most sensible 
solution.>> (Areeda & Turner 1976, 897).19  
Scherer had failed to understand that Areeda and Turner never intended to deny that, say, even an 
above-cost price set by a dominant firm might well be harmful for competition and welfare. Their 
whole point was that, given the institutional limitations of courts and agencies, there was no reliable 
way to condemn such behaviour without chilling pro-competitive conduct. Indeed, calling into play 
as an essential ingredient of law enforcement elements like the defendant’s intent <<…was 
precisely the evil that Areeda and Turner were seeking to avoid, and the evil committed by earlier 
decisions…>> (Hovenkamp 1996, 835).  
Yet Scherer’s suggestion found more favorable reception in authors such as Dick Schmalensee or 
Alvin Klevorick. The former argued that, absent any simple predation model with a clear test, the 
only two robust approaches to PP were either the “hands off”, Chicago-style one – i.e., to drop the 
conduct from the list of proscribed practices – or Scherer’s rule of reason, this being <<… the only 
one economically defensible general policy choice>> (Schmalensee 1979, 1027), The latter, in an 
influential paper with Paul Joskow, suggested a two-tier structuralist rule of reason approach, 
premised on the circumstance that no straightforward rule based only on behavioral considerations 
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 <<[A] thorough examination of the factual circumstances accompanying the monopolist’s alleged predatory behavior, 
how the monopolist’s officials perceived the probable effects of its behavior (i.e., intent), and the structural 
consequences actually flowing from the behavior>> (Scherer 1976, 890). 
19
 Curiously enough, these critiques were echoed by Chicago champion Robert Bork, who deemed Scherer’s proposal 
simply unworkable. In reference to Scherer’s list of features on which courts were called to inquiry, Bork claimed that: 
<<There could hardly be drawn a list of criteria less fit for judicial employment. Those items on the list that would not 
be altered by the monopolist’s knowledge of the rules are unknowable by either courts or economists. It is a mistake to 
suppose that all of the questions posed by in abstract geometric representation of demand and cost phenomena can 
usefully be addressed in a court proceeding.>> (Bork 1978, 155). In his rejoinder to Areeda and Turner, Scherer 
acknowledged that speculative elements were inescapable in his suggested procedure, but also remarked that 
speculation was not new to antitrust adjudication, nor were the information requirements as big as implied by Areeda 
and Turner’s reply (Scherer 1976b, 903). 
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(such as the ATR, but also the rules by Williamson or Baumol, on which see below) might provide 
a proper means for distinguishing among different market situations and thus minimizing judicial 
errors. Only their two-tier rule of reason – which required a Harvard-style structural analysis in the 
first stage and a behavioral inquiry in the second stage, but only for those cases where structural 
analysis yielded a reasonable expectation that the predator might have actually exploited its 
monopoly power – could combine a sufficient flexibility in response to market specificities and the 
minimization of implementation costs (Joskow & Klevorick 1979, 243). Moreover, their approach 
looked consistent with one of the latest Supreme Court decisions on the matter at that time, namely, 
the highly debatable Grinnell test which, as I said before, required assessing, first, whether the firm 
had monopoly power in the relevant market and, second, whether it had willfully acquired or 
maintained that power “as distinguished from growth as a consequence of superior product, 
business acumen or historic accident”.  
  Finally, this view found another authoritative endorsement in the conclusions of Joseph Brodley 
and George Hay’s 1981 survey on PP.20 While acknowledging that <<[p]rior to 1975, predatory 
pricing was a loosely structured, somewhat opaque area of law in which the generality of the legal 
standard left room for the exercise of judicial discretion. The legal decisions, which failed to reflect 
a systematic use of economic theory, were at least partially influenced by the perceived fairness or 
unfairness of the dominant firm’s pricing policies…>> (Brodley & Hay 1981, 792), a few years’ 
experience with ATR had convinced them that, due to <<[t]he adoption of a marginal cost pricing 
rule by several courts […] …the range of judicial discretion was seriously confined.>> (793), so 
much so that <<…consistent litigation losses by plaintiffs demonstrated that for all practical 
purposes a predatory pricing plaintiff could not meet the standard imposed by the marginal cost 
rule. […] [The rule] holds dominant firm pricing per se legal.>> (ibid.).  The outcome was 
unacceptable both because <<[m]ore recent economic literature […] fails to demonstrate a 
consensus justifying the dismissal of predatory pricing as irrational behavior.>> (ibid.)21 and 
because <<…the courts did not purport to adopt the marginal cost pricing rule as a device for 
eliminating the predatory pricing offense and establishing the per legality of dominant firm pricing. 
On the contrary, they adopted it without explicitly considering the drastic effect it would have on 
legal decisions.>> (ibid.). Their conclusion once more endorsed a rule of reason solution, as the 
authors provocatively asked: <<…do not all of the preceding considerations suggest a renewed 
emphasis on the values and insights inlaid in long-standing judicial experience, built upon case-by-
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 Hay was chief economist at the US Department of Justice from 1973 to 1980. He is credited with having played a 
major role in convincing the DOJ to hire “real” (i.e., PhD) economists in order to apply “real” economic theory to 
antitrust issues (R.T. Masson, personal communication, April 21, 2009). 
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 On the specific literature summoned by the authors in this passage, see below.  
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case adjudication, and on the advantage of incremental policy change, achieved gradually and with 
opportunity for self-correction?>> (794). 
The reason I have given so much room to the Scherer et al.’s position in the debate is that their 
views foreran one of the main outcomes of the subsequent game-theoretic literature on predation, 
namely, the impossibility of identifying a so-called “bright line standard”, i.e., a simple rule capable 
of discerning with high reliability when a given price/quantity pair set by a firm could be deemed 
predatory. As I explain below, the application of strategic reasoning to PP forces the plaintiff in any 
given case to devise a plausible story explaining why the available facts constitute evidence of 
predatory behavior. Though game theory suggests that all plausible PP stories have to fall within 
one or the other of a few general categories, every court will have to examine the soundness of the 
specific story offered by the plaintiff and thus to adopt a rule-of-reason kind of scrutiny. In short, 
Scherer’s rule of reason and game-theoretic reasoning share a hostility towards the application of 
simple, mechanical rules and a clear inclination for careful, case-by-case analysis.      
 
2.3 Even the opposite view in the post-ATR debate is more interesting for its background and 
general implications than for the specific suggestions. This was the position of those who remained 
faithful to Areeda and Turner’s message, yet argued for a different, better rule than the ATR. The 
list of alternative rules is quite long, the main ones being those suggested by the likes of Richard 
Posner (who argued that, since the real problem of PP was when a less efficient predator killed a 
more efficient rival, a price should be automatically considered exclusionary if and only if set at a 
level calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient competitor: see Posner 
1976, 188)22, Oliver Williamson (who focused on entry deterrence and claimed that an output, 
rather than a price, rule made more economic sense, in particular a rule forbidding a market leader 
to expand its short run output following a rival’s entry, regardless of the price being above AVC: 
see Williamson 1977, 334) and William Baumol (whose quasi-permanent price cut rule left the 
market leader free to cut prices following entry, but forbade him to re-raise the price in case the 
entrant left the market: see Baumol 1979, 4).23 What is really remarkable in those rules is not their 
specific content, but the kind of analysis which supported them. All the authors in this stream of 
literature recognized that the major fault in Areeda and Turner’s analysis was their having 
downplayed the fact that PP is a kind of strategic behavior which necessarily involves intertemporal 
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 Also see Posner 1979, 939-944. 
23
 To this we might add the second stage of Joskow & Klevorick’s 1979 two-tier approach. The authors suggested that 
courts adopt for that stage both the basic AVC version of the ATR, as a sort of quick check of predation, and a total cost 
standard, whereby a price should be deemed predatory if less than average total cost (ATC) or, in case of multi-product 
firms, average incremental cost (see Joskow & Klevorick 1979, 245 ff.). The latter notion was also the basis of Ordover 
& Willig 1981’s rule. The notion of average incremental cost (AIC) had been first proposed in Baumol 1979, 9, fn.26. 
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considerations – a critique also shared by Scherer and the other supporters of the rule of reason 
approach, but which was more biting in the case of authors endorsing Areeda and Turner’s 
operational urge.   
The author who emphasized most this drawback in Areeda & Turner 1975 was Oliver 
Williamson. Indeed, his 1977 contribution to the debate may be taken as the clearest exposition of 
the strategic and intertemporal aspects of PP before the advent of formal game theory. Thus, his 
model explicitly acknowledged:24 i) that predation could be used for entry deterrence as much as for 
the elimination of existing rivals;25 ii) that the standard notion of “sacrifice profits now for higher 
profits tomorrow” necessarily entailed a kind of strategic reasoning and had to be explicitly 
modeled in an intertemporal setup; iii) that PP could be used strategically as a signal to deter future 
entry; iv) that, crucially to Williamson’s argument, the market leader might strategically perform 
some pre-entry actions, like building an excess capacity, which aimed at preempt entry itself (a 
point for which Williamson recognized his debt to the formal model of pre-entry strategic choices 
in Spence 1977); and v) that the leader’s strategic adaptation to the law had also to be considered 
when devising a rule aimed at addressing predatory behavior. Nonetheless, Williamson still 
endorsed Areeda and Turner’s operational goal, while rejecting Scherer’s proposal.26 
As I said before, Williamson rule looked at the leader’s output and imposed that he abstain from 
increasing his quantity following a rival’s entry. The rule was clearly addressed at neutralizing the 
leader’s threat to make recourse to his pre-entry-built excess capacity in order to flood the market 
and thus push the price below the level any entrant would find sustainable. This would make the 
leader’s (socially inefficient, but privately long run profitable) choice to build an excess capacity 
irrational in the first place. Williamson also noted that ATR could not prevent, or prohibit, this kind 
of pre-entry behavior, as long as the price following post-entry output expansion was still above the 
leader’s marginal or average variable cost. It followed that, despite Areeda and Turner’s claims, the 
ATR was unable to warrant social efficiency both before and after entry (ibid., 335).  
In the same spirit came the 1979 Baumol rule. The paper’s goal was explicitly that of proposing 
<<…a simple rule that enjoys significant optimality properties with respect to economic efficiency. 
Equally important, the rule is relatively easy to administer.>> (Baumol 1979, 1). Reasoning in 
intertemporal terms, Baumol recognized that the threat caused by PP to competition and welfare 
was not a function of the relationship between price and costs, but rather a matter of the 
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 See Williamson 1977, 284-287. 
25
 More than that: according to Williamson, specific examples might be built where PP was seemingly unprofitable with 
respect to the exclusionary goal and yet fully rational in view of the entry deterrence purpose.    
26
 This in a long footnote where he argued that following Scherer would entail replacing antitrust enforcement with a 
sort of market regulation by a price commission: <<Rather than slip inadvertently into a regulatory posture – which, 
experience discloses, is typically hostile toward competition – antitrust is better advised to seek simple rules enforceable 
in court.>> (Williamson 1977, 288, fn.16). 
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responsiveness of pricing to changing competitive conditions (ibid, 3). This was testified by the fact 
that a leader might temporarily cut its price when entry occurred, only to raise it again after the 
entry threat disappeared. The suggested rule would let the leader free to lower its price in response 
to entry, but would also force him to bear the long run consequences of his choice by forbidding 
him to re-raise the price for a fairly long period of time. Such a rule was explicitly addressed at 
destroying the “low profits now, higher profits tomorrow” rationale of PP, and also had the side 
benefit of ensuring that only efficient entrants would survive, as these would be the only firms 
capable of sustaining the leader’s low market price in the long run (ibid., 5).  
These two examples of post-ATR rules suffice for my point: in view of the later history of PP law 
and economics, the most remarkable outcome of the intense debate following Areeda & Turner 
1975 was the emphasis on the strategic and intertemporal features of PP. This was not entirely 
novel stuff, because similar considerations had also been raised during the 1960s and early 1970s 
debate stemming from McGee 1958.27 But never before had the strategic and intertemporal 
character of predatory behavior been more clearly revealed than in Williamson’s or Baumol’s 
paper. More than that, these and similar papers explicitly made the point that only by focusing on 
these features could the rationality of PP be demonstrated. In other words, giving full weight to 
strategic and intertemporal aspects was the necessary, and often also sufficient, condition to prove 
that PP might well be a profitable business strategy and so could really happen in the real world, 
thereby deserving the application of antitrust law to avoid its anti-competitive consequences. Given 
that ATR could not handle the strategic and intertemporal features of PP, some of the authors in the 
post-ATR debate aimed at devising new, better rules to fill the gap, while others denied that any 
simple rule could ever effectively handle them. In short, at the end of the 1970s everyone involved 
in the theoretical debate shared the notion that only a properly constructed story, with explicit room 
for strategic and intertemporal elements might justify the existence of PP as an antitrust violation.   
 
2.4 Even the authors in the Chicago tradition could not avoid dealing with these features. For 
example, after recognizing that the pioneer of the Chicago approach to PP, McGee 1958, had 
neglected strategic considerations in his analysis, Posner underlined their relevance by noting that: 
<<Since classical (or, one might add, modern) economics contains no generally accepted theory of 
strategic behavior, it is not surprising that the Chicago school should not have been particularly 
concerned with predatory pricing. Eliminate strategic considerations, and it becomes impossible to 
construct a rational motivation for predatory pricing without assuming (very uncongenially to a 
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 The most “strategically oriented” paper had been Yamey 1972. See AUTHOR 2009 for more details.  
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Chicagoan) asymmetric access to the capital markets for financing a period of below-cost selling. 
But to ignore strategic considerations is not satisfactory.>> (Posner 1979, 939).28  
All Chicagoans contributing to the post-ATR debate had at least to take position with respect to 
the role played by strategic and intertemporal considerations, if only to dismiss their relevance. 
Think of Bork’s 1978 critiques against Scherer’s proposal.29 In these words one may read a 
leitmotif of Chicago view not only with respect to PP, but to antitrust enforcement in general, 
namely, the idea that courts will never have the amount of information required to properly perform 
a rule of reason analysis without running the risk of incurring in serious mistakes. This critique 
applies to the rule of reason, but also – indeed, more forcefully – to the kind of stories underpinning 
the post-ATR view of PP, as even those stories may well be considered a manifestation of the 
<<…abstract geometric representation of demand and cost phenomena.>> (Bork 1978, 155). Bork 
recognized that, theoretically speaking, nothing was impossible with respect to PP – a statement 
which we may reinterpret as the acknowledgement that a rigorous story in which PP is rational 
business strategy may always be told – but stressed that the real issue was <<…the probability of 
the occurrence of predation and the means available for detecting it.>> (ibid., 145).  
Or think of McGee’s 1980 reassessment of predatory pricing where, while defending what he 
himself called the “diehard Chicagoan position” according to which attempts at predation <<…have 
been rare, and […] successful attempts will be found to be still rarer.>> (McGee 1980, 292, text and 
fn.15),30 he claimed that if a workable rule was ever to be called forth, it had to be a cost-based rule. 
Among the reasons for this thesis, McGee gave both the difficulty of establishing, inherent 
ambiguity and effective irrelevance of the price cutter’s intent and of his rivals’ mental states, on 
the one side, and the impossibility to distinguish in the real world between short-run and long-run 
profit maximization, on the other (ibid., 292). Two reasons which clearly addressed, and countered, 
the building blocks of those <<…increasingly complex and speculative models…>> of predation 
with strategic and intertemporal features.31 
Bork’s critiques were echoed by Easterbrook 1981. In one of the earliest papers in the Chicago 
tradition to acknowledge the pending game-theoretic revolution in IO, Easterbrook devoted two 
long sections to “Signaling from one market to another” and “Strategic commitments” (ibid., 282 
ff.). In the first he dealt with the argument that a firm may aim at building a reputation of ruthless 
predator in order to persuade rivals to stay out of, or abandon, its markets. The analysis was not 
explicitly game-theoretic, but a few hints here and there illuminated the reader about what was soon 
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 Posner was at that time still unaware of the imminent game-theoretic revolution in IO.   
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 See above, footnote 19. 
30
 McGee’s words will be almost verbatim reproduced in 1986 by the Supreme Court in its famous Matsushita dictum 
<<… predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.>>, on which see below, §6.  
31
 A more explicit critique against the entry deterrence view of PP is at pp.298-300 of McGee 1980.  
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to happen in IO literature. First, Easterbrook referred to a work on cooperative game theory by 
Lester Telser where it is shown that no determinate solution exists to the game of threats between 
the leader and the entrants when more than two firms were involved (Telser 1972). Then he offered 
the gist of Reinherdt Selten’s chain store paradox (see next §), namely, that under perfect 
information no predation will ever occur, yet without quoting Selten’s seminal paper (Easterbrook 
1981, 285-286).32 Finally, he claimed that in case of less than perfect information <<[t]he solution 
to the game becomes even more murky […] If each firm is uncertain of the other’s costs, neither 
has a clearly superior strategy.>> (ibid., 286). Easterbrook’s conclusion was trenchant: <<it has not 
been proved that predatory signaling is a profitable strategy. […] …the inconclusive arguments 
about signaling are inadequate to justify legal intervention.>> (ibid., 288).  
A similar skepticism pervaded the following section of Easterbrook’s survey, dedicated to 
“Strategic commitments”, in particular Michael Spence’s model of entry-deterring investment 
(Spence 1977) and Williamson’s output rule. According to Easterbrook, entry deterrence theories of 
PP were basically flawed,33 so much so that <<[a]ny attempt to condemn capacity selection 
decisions as predatory carries with it an unavoidable risk of deterring firms from selecting the most 
desirable response to change.>> (Easterbrook 1981, 290). Moreover, he noted that <<A strong case 
can be made that limit pricing[34] does not exclude entry under any circumstances.>>. The paper he 
mentioned in support of such a categorical statement was one by P. Milgrim (sic!) and J. Roberts, 
titled “Equilibrium limit pricing doesn’t limit entry” (see ibid., 297, fn.74), that is to say, the early 
version of the enormously influential Milgrom & Roberts 1982a which, as I argue below, officially 
launched the modern game-theoretic approach to PP. 
In conclusion, the main element of novelty emerging from the heated post-ATR debate was 
brought by neither the appeals to the return to fully-fledged rule of reason scrutiny nor the search 
for more refined cost-based or quantity-based rules. Regardless of their beliefs about the frequency 
and seriousness of PP as an antitrust offense, all the authors involved in the debate either built, or at 
least made use of, predation stories which contained explicit intertemporal and strategic features. 
Static, non-strategic analysis – of the kind underlying the old legal approach to PP cases or Areeda 
& Turner 1975 – looked totally inadequate for dealing with predation. At the same time, these 
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 What he refers to in fn.48 is a 1980 NBER paper by R. Masson and R. Roberts (sic! The real co-author was Robert 
Reynolds) which however has never been published. In a personal communication of April 21, 2009, Robert Masson 
told me that the paper was rejected by the Rand Journal of Economics. The work eventually led to a publication in the 
1985 Journal of Industrial Economics, but only after the addition of a third co-author (David Easley) and the injection 
of a formal argument based on Harsanyi’s games of incomplete information (instead of the rational expectations 
approach used in 1980). The published paper is Easley, Masson and Reynolds 1985, one of the most quoted 
contributions to the game-theoretic literature on PP.       
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 Among the defects, it is remarkable that Easterbrook (1981, 295) mentioned the fact that in Williamson model only 
the incumbent was supposed to act strategically, while the entrants were modeled as sticking to a rigid decision rule.   
34
 Easterbrook considered limit pricing equivalent to Williamson’s argument. Also see the previous fn. 
 17 
stories showed that the Chicago mantra of PP as “rarely tried and even more rarely successful” had 
at least to be qualified, if not wholly discarded, in view of plausible narratives showing that 
predation could actually be rational business behavior. Even those authors who abided by Areeda 
and Turner’s operational imperative and thus synthesized their contribution in terms of a court-
friendly rule, recognized that the call for new rules stemmed from the inadequacy of the ATR to 
discriminate among price cuts in a strategic and intertemporal environment. And even those others 
who still stuck to the Chicago mantra could not avoid dealing with the new, richer stories of PP if 
they wished to uphold their derogatory thesis.       
 
2.5 What was the outcome of the post-ATR debate in US antitrust courts? As with the original 
Areeda & Turner 1975, the impact has been fast and relevant. Out of 249 significant35 PP cases in 
the period 1975-1992, at least 18 quoted Scherer 1976 (the first in 1977), 18 referred to Williamson 
1977 (first hit in 1978), 6 to Baumol 1979 and 10 to Joskow & Klevorick 1979 (Source: Lexis). In 
terms of actual law enforcement, absent a new Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue, most 
courts endorsed a kind of “augmented ATR”,36 which amounted to considering, respectively, surely 
lawful and surely unlawful any price above average total cost and below average variable cost, 
while considering only presumably lawful – a presumption rebuttable by evidence of intent and 
market structure –  any price between AVC and ATC.  
The “augmented ATR”, which recalled the solutions suggested by Joskow & Kleovrick 1979 and 
Brodley & Hay 1981, brought to an “enforcement equilibrium” in that, far from the populist 
excesses of the pre-ATR era, plaintiffs enjoyed for a decade or so a low, but non-negligible, success 
rate in PP cases: about 17% between 1982 and 1993, up from almost nil in the years immediately 
after the ATR (see Bolton, Brodley & Riordan 2000, 2254). Adding the out-of-trial settlements, this 
is a number which might well represent a balanced approach to the violation. The equilibrium was 
broken only in 1993, with the Supreme Court’s Brooke decision which caused the success rate in PP 
litigations to drop once more to 0%, leading to a new era of de facto legalization of any price cut by 
a dominant firm – an era which still goes on today.  
Leaving to §§6-7 my assessment of Brooke, two remarks need be made here. First, US antitrust 
courts seemed to be receptive to the kind of PP stories told in the post-ATR literature, but only as 
long as these stories were translated into an operational cost-based rule like the “augmented-
ATR”. In other words, rather than being persuaded by the intertemporal and strategic arguments 
underlying the new stories, courts were attracted by the higher flexibility of the new rules with 
respect to the strict yes-or-no character of the original ATR. This confirms that at least some of the 
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 As Bolton, Brodley & Riordan (2000, 2253) called it. 
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economists involved in the debate had apparently learned Areeda and Turner’s lesson on how to 
have an impact on courts – i.e., by offering simple, highly operational rules.37 
The second remark is that, theoretically speaking, the “enforcement equilibrium” should have 
shifted in the opposite direction. As I said before, the year 1982 marked the official beginning of the 
new game-theoretic approach to PP, an approach which in the following two decades has produced 
several rigorous demonstrations that, far from being irrational, predatory behavior may well be the 
most profitable choice for a dominant firm in a variety of plausible settings – in other words, that 
many convincing stories may be told in courts to demonstrate that PP is an actual possibility. 
Moreover, one of the key findings of the new approach has been the absence of any necessary 
relation between a predatory price and the leader’s production costs; this entails that the boundaries 
of the “augmented ATR” may well be trespassed, as even a price above ATC may still be predatory 
if properly interpreted in terms of a rigorous strategic story. Thus, one should expect that, much as it 
had happened in 1975, US antitrust courts should have swiftly embraced the new theories and, 
accordingly, revised upward their conviction rates in PP cases. Yet, the opposite actually happened: 
Brooke shifted the enforcement equilibrium further away from where adherence to the new strategic 
theories should have led it. Indeed, as I detail in the rest of the paper, the game-theoretic approach 
to predation has been almost totally neglected by US antitrust courts. 
 
 
§3. It’s a brand new game: the methodology of strategic predation 
 
The development of rigorous strategic models of PP in the early 1980s is a landmark in the history 
of modern game theory. These were among the earliest models where new techniques and solution 
concepts were applied to analyze so-called asymmetric information games (AIG henceforth), i.e., 
games devoid of the traditional assumption of perfect information. It goes well beyond the 
boundaries of this paper to investigate how and why AIG were developed, as well as their influence 
on the rise of modern information economics (including mechanism design theory) and on the 
establishment of game theory as the hard core of neoclassical economics (a result the first 
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 Such an extreme view of US courts’ pro-rules attitude may be softened in form, though not in substance, by following 
Thomas Kauper’s thesis, namely, that courts’ acceptance of price theory meant that very tight boundaries were set to the 
kind of stories which could be told in litigations. If a story making economic sense could not be told in support of the 
plaintiff’s argument, a PP charge had to be summarily disposed of. This established what Kauper calls a “could test”: go 
on with the trial in search of facts only when economic harm could possibly occur, i.e., only when a plausible, 
theoretically-sound story exists to explain it. It follows that the mid-1970s – early 1980s cost-based rules were nothing 
but the manifestation of the failure of plaintiffs’ PP stories to pass the “could test”. For example, the ATR simply meant 
that, according to price theory, no plausible PP story could be told if price was higher than AVC (Kauper 1993, 348-9). 
§§3-4 show that game-theoretic IO aimed exactly at providing a new set of plausible PP stories. 
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generation of game theorists had largely missed).38 Suffices here to say that, thanks to the 
contributions of Reinherd Selten and John Harsanyi and the related extension of strategic analysis to 
games with imperfect or incomplete information, it is hardly an exaggeration to speak of a late 
1970s / early 1980s “resurrection” of game theory – a fresh start whose eventual consequences may 
be best appreciated by comparing the discipline’s relevance within economics before and after those 
crucial years. Indeed, the circumstance that some of the foundational papers of the AIG literature 
also were the milestones for the strategic approach to PP may somehow make up for a more 
thorough reconstruction, as the gist of the argument supporting the strategic analysis of predation 
may also partly capture the motivations behind the overall “resurrection” of game theory.  
The crucial role played by Selten in this story makes it hardly surprising that one of those key 
papers was the classic Selten 1978, with the celebrated chain store paradox. In that paper Selten 
proved that no predation existed in the game equilibrium under perfect information. Yet, from the 
viewpoint of antitrust law and economics, the real message of Selten’s result – and the correct way 
to interpret it – was the opposite, namely, that PP was not a problem only under the heroic 
assumption of perfect information, because the assumption was crucial for the logic of backward 
induction to generate the paradoxical outcome. Thus, the paper was like an invitation to game 
theorists to investigate what the game equilibrium would be with the addition of a bit of imperfect 
or incomplete information. Given that the specific instance of economic behavior which Selten had 
chosen in order to grant actual content to his formal result was PP, it was natural for those accepting 
Selten’s invitation to build their new games around predation stories. 
Why did Selten choose PP as the theme for his seminal paper? More importantly,39 why did 
predation provide such a fertile ground for the new game-theoretic literature? Part of the answer is 
obviously that, since the postwar years, IO problems in less-than-perfectly competitive markets 
have always constituted the most natural setting for game theory. But why PP in particular (i.e., a 
problem of dominant firm behavior), rather than more obvious picks, like, say, oligopoly or 
collusion? The answer lies in what economists had already noticed as the necessary intertemporal 
and strategic character of predation. The simple notion of “cut price now to earn more profits 
tomorrow” creates a very friendly environment for AIG modeling because it is a notion which – 
generally speaking – calls for the formulation of sequential strategies by both the predator and the 
possible prey(s), with each of these strategies entailing an account of a firm’s knowledge about the 
rival’s characteristics and the expectations about its behavior. Moreover, several stories existed to 
render in plain language the chain of ideas and behaviors underlying a predation episode. As we 
know from the previous §§, these were all features of PP which economists had already well 
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 It is a story still awaiting to be fully told, but see AUTHOR 2009a.  
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 Especially in view of Selten’s own answer to the previous question: see Selten 1978, 158, fn.1 
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understood by the late 1970s. What game theorists were required to do was just to formalize them 
by either transforming the existing PP stories into formal sequences of actions and beliefs or 
inventing brand new ones.  
This explanation may even be strengthened a little bit by arguing that PP offered highbrow game 
theorists the ideal environment to give actual import to what would otherwise look like purely 
abstract arguments (think of the new solution concepts for Bayesian games), totally detached from 
real world problems. In other words, assuming you were a game theorist, still striving in the early 
1980s to persuade the wider audience of economics practitioners of the practical relevance of your 
analytical tools, the problem of predation offered an excellent opportunity40 to score a few easy 
points. Indeed, by focusing on the much more realistic case of  imperfect or incomplete information, 
AIG also scored a point in terms of higher realism than the standard price-theoretic models, based 
as they were on the (often implicit) assumption of perfect information.41 
The events following Selten 1978 are fairly well known by anybody acquainted to modern IO. In 
1982 two pairs of authors, John Milgrom and Paul Roberts, David Kreps and David Wilson, 
published a set of papers (Milgrom & Roberts 1982a, 1982b; Kreps & Wilson 1982) which, by 
applying AIG to the twin problems of limit and predatory pricing, marked the official beginning of 
the modern game-theoretic approach to antitrust economics, where the italicized word “modern” 
should be read as synonymous of “à la Harsanyi-Selten”, i.e., of games under less than perfect 
information. After this first inflow, a flood of strategic literature followed, so much so that at the 
end of the 1980s the entire field of IO had been re-designed in terms of game-theoretic tools, 
methods and ways of reasoning. One of clearest signs of the success of game theory in conquering 
IO – thereby fulfilling after more than 40 years the prediction first formulated at the time of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior42 – was the publication in 
1989 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization (Schmalensee & Willig eds. 1989), a magnus 
opus and fundamental reference where game-theoretic modeling was simply ubiquitous.     
The common idea in the three foundational papers (see Milgrom 1988) was that, in a realistic 
setup of less than perfect information, a firm endowed with market power may try to discourage a 
competitor from entering, or remaining in, the market by manipulating its beliefs. The idea was first 
introduced by Milgrom & Roberts 1982a, who applied it to limit pricing, but soon extended by the 
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same authors, as well as by Kreps and Wilson, to PP. When a firm considers entering a market, it 
must base its decision on its expectations of post-entry profits. This depends on whether the 
incumbent responds aggressively and, if so, on the intensity of the aggressive response (say, how 
much will the price fall following entry?).  Hence, the potential entrant’s expectations are crucial in 
determining its entry decision. But the incumbent can, by its actions, influence these expectations.  
While it would be impossible to manipulate a rival’s beliefs under the perfect information setup of 
price-theoretic models, the addition of even a small amount of either asymmetric or incomplete 
information makes the trick. For example, by responding aggressively to entry, a predator may be 
able to convince that specific entrant, or any other future entrant, that entry into that market is 
unprofitable. It follows that predation does not even have to “kill” the competitor in order to 
achieve its goal of affecting the rivals’ expectations and thus be a profitable strategy; in the case of 
a multi-market incumbent, it is not even necessary that the incumbent directly profits from its price-
cutting in the contested market. Moreover, opposite to McGee’s 1958 result (which Milgrom and 
Roberts wrongly took as the state-of-the-art on PP in IO literature),43 if the incumbent does succeed 
to drive a competitor out of the market, new entry will not inevitably follow as soon as the 
incumbent raises its price to reap the benefits of its success because it is now possible that other 
potential entrants – having witnessed the poor lot of their predecessor – will no longer expect to 
earn a profit by entering. 
Assessing their achievement in a 1987 paper, Milgrom and Roberts identified PP as the best 
example of the theoretical gains provided by the AIG perspective. Totally neglecting the outcomes 
of the post-ATR debates, and in clear reference to the most extreme Chicago position, they claimed 
that around 1980 the only consistent analysis of PP, based as it was on the compelling logic of 
standard price theory, indicated that predation could not be expected to succeed and was not a 
rational strategy. Notwithstanding real world instances of PP by dominant firms, mainstream 
economists were unshaken: <<… because no mere fact ever was a match in economics for a 
consistent theory, these ideas began to represent the basis for a new consensus.>> (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1987, 185). Yet, this consensus decisively rested on the implicit assumption of symmetric 
information. It was precisely here that their contribution had brought a crucial improvement, first 
and foremost in terms of the realism of the model’s conclusions: AIG showed that predation could 
well be rational under more realistic informational settings, so much so that we should expect to see 
predatory strategies being undertaken by real world firms if not effectively deterred by legal 
prohibitions. Milgrom and Roberts proudly concluded that in a few years the AIG methodology had 
allowed the first truly satisfactory treatment of a very old IO issue like PP. This was a general 
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 See Milgrom & Roberts 1987, 185. This position was only partially corrected in Milgrom & Roberts 1990, 113-115, 
where they still failed to mention the strategic-oriented post-ATR literature. 
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result: the kind of business behavior emerging from AIG’s equilibria captured a lot more of the 
richness of observed reality (ibid., 187).44 
Another crucial innovation brought by AIG to PP literature was the dismissal of cost 
considerations as the crucial tool for demonstrating actual predation. As remarked by Milgrom & 
Roberts (1990, 115), game-theoretic models undermine the ATR and all its variants because AIG 
not only shows that predation can be profitable, but also that predatory prices bear no necessary 
relation to the incumbent’s marginal or average costs. This is the logical consequence of the fact 
that predation aims at affecting the rivals’ expectations of future profits: why should such an effect 
depend on the incumbent’s production costs? At most, it should depend on the entrant’s costs – and 
possibly on none’s costs at all. As a confirmation, the PP stories emerging from the AIG literature 
make hardly any reference to production costs.  
Before turning to these stories, we need to remark that among the early 1980s game-theoretic 
models also featured a rigorous formulation of the traditional deep-pocket version of PP, so 
frequently referred to in the legal realm (see above, §1). In a 1984 paper Jean-Pierre Benoit showed 
that even that story, effectively demolished by McGee 1958, could nonetheless be given a solid 
theoretical basis, provided some asymmetric information (about, say, how deep a firm’s pocket is) 
was injected in the model. Assume the entrant is financially constrained as in the classic legal story. 
If the incumbent is uncertain about the entrant’s willingness to fight predation until bankruptcy, 
then PP episodes may actually happen. In other words, under less-than-perfect information a 
predatory price war –  aimed at the “usual” goal of driving the entrant out of the market (not, as in 
the other AIG models, at deterring other potential entrants) and ending up with either cooperation or 
the entrant’s defeat – may obtain as an equilibrium phenomenon (Benoit 1984). Thus, as long 
argued in the legal literature, it may sometimes be rational for a firm which is financially stronger 
than another to use its deeper pockets to set a low price and force the rival out of the market. Note 
that this is the only instance of an AIG-based story where below-cost pricing is essential for 
predation, though even here price need not be below the predator’s MC as in ATR: what is needed 
is that price be set so low that it generates a negative cash flow for the prey. Hence, it is the prey’s 
costs that matter, not the predator’s.45  
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 On superior realism, rather than higher rigor, being the true plus of AIG also see Phlips 1988, Ch.7. 
45
 It must be added that Benoit model is the weakest, theoretically speaking, among those of the first AIG generation. 
For a critique see Milgrom & Roberts 1990, 120; Motta 2004, 435. 
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§4. And a new playbook too! 
 
Apart from Benoit 1984, the new game-theoretic playbook of PP only contained stories where 
predation was used to manipulate the other firms’ beliefs. Three basic plots were offered in the AIG 
literature (see Milgrom & Roberts 1990). In the first, so-called signaling models (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1982b), the incumbent has an information advantage about a market feature which is key to 
the prey’s exit and output decisions – for example his own (i.e., the incumbent’s) production costs. 
The prey may infer the rival’s costs by observing his pricing behavior, but this is exactly where the 
possibility arises for the incumbent to bias the rival’s inferences by setting a predatory price in order 
to look like a “tough” (i.e., low-cost) rival.  
However, at the equilibrium of the signaling game (a rational expectation equilibrium) PP does 
not induce the prey to underestimate the profitability of continuing operation or overestimate the 
predator’s toughness. It follows that, according to Milgrom & Roberts’s story, predation does not 
cause the prey’s exit nor restrains her future price and output choices because it fails to affect her 
beliefs. Why then should the incumbent be willing to undertake PP if it is not going to succeed? The 
answer provided by Milgrom & Roberts is a perfect example of the game-theoretic logic: the prey is 
so rational that it is perfectly capable of understanding the incumbent’s incentives, so much so that 
were the latter not to prey, the former would conclusively infer that he is “soft” (i.e., has higher 
costs) and thus would compete more aggressively against him.  
Two remarks are of order here. The first is obvious: if PP fails, why should it be a concern for 
antitrust law? Such a concern would be justified only in case the prey is less than perfectly able to 
“read” the predator’s incentives and thus may be induced to wrongly exit the market. Moreover, the 
prospect of facing low profits due to predation by a better-informed incumbent may well deter entry 
in the market even if, should entry occur, the predation would not succeed. In the latter case, 
antitrust law might legitimately be concerned about the dynamic inefficiency of entry deterrence, 
rather than by the static welfare loss of post-predation monopoly.46  
The second remark is that this kind of story clearly shows the irrelevance of marginal or average 
cost. Indeed, the predator aims at convincing the prey that his costs are lower than they actually are, 
but this has no relation with the predator’s actual costs. It follows that a price capable of biasing the 
prey’s beliefs may even be greater than the incumbent’s ATC: such a price would be predatory in 
Milgrom & Roberts’ story, but would be perfectly legal under the ATR and all its variants. 
A second category of AIG-based PP story is the so-called signal-jamming model (as in Fudenberg 
& Tirole 1986). Again the element of incomplete information is provided by an unobservable 
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variable that the prey is trying to gauge and again there is a distribution of observable correlates of 
the unobservable variable which depends on the incumbent’s actions. However, there is no 
assumption that the latter has an informational advantage over the prey. Hence the predator’s action 
cannot depend on the value of the unknown variable as in signaling models because that variable is 
unobservable to him as well. An element of informational asymmetry does exist, though: the 
predator’s actions which affect the observable correlates of the unobservable variable cannot be 
known by the prey.  
The typical setting for rendering this story in plain language is that of test-marketing predation. 
Assume the prey is running a marketing test for a product to be launched in a market where the 
predator is already active. The incumbent may then try to disrupt the prey’s test by secretly 
lowering his price (say, by offering discounts to his distributors or loyal customers) or by 
undertaking any other action which may lead the prey to misread the test’s results and 
underestimate the profitability of entry in that market.47 As in signaling models, predatory behavior 
has no effect on the prey’s equilibrium choice. Thus, the predator fails once more in his goal of 
excluding or disciplining the rival. Yet, predate he must, given the prey’s rational expectation that 
he will try to do so. Again this fact may deter some entry, thus raising antitrust concerns.   
The third kind of story is perhaps the most well known and has to do with the incumbent’s 
reputation, as in Milgrom & Roberts 1982a and Kreps & Wilson 1982. Here the incumbent’s goal is 
explicitly to deter future entry by preying on current rivals, independently of whether the predation 
actually induces the target to exit the market. The informational asymmetry here is that it is private 
information to the predator whether he would prey in a specific market. The fact that the 
“willingness to prey” is private information means that, from the prey’s viewpoint, there is a 
positive probability that the incumbent is a “natural predator”, i.e., a firm always preying his rivals. 
As a consequence, failure to prey once destroys reputation of being a natural predator forever, 
leading to future entry of all possible rivals. It follows that preying may be worthwhile for the 
incumbent even if it is immediately costly, since fighting entry is the only way to preserve an 
incumbent’s reputation and thus deter future entry. The natural setting for these reputation models is 
that of multi-markets firms where what happens in one market is observable by actual and potential 
rivals in other markets. The more the markets, the greater the incentive to preserve reputation by 
always fighting entry.48   
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 The unobservable variable, unknown to both firms, is the prey’s profits or market share; the observable correlate is 
the test result; the predator’s unobservable, and test-disruptive, action is the secret price cut. 
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 A fourth version of PP story also deserves to be mentioned in that it avoids some of the drawbacks of reputation 
models. In the latter, it is necessary to introduce a number of restrictive assumptions, say, that entry occurs sequentially 
in one market at a time by a different entrant (this actually means that each predation episode never aims at preventing 
simultaneous entry in other markets), that the incumbent’s type may only be one of the two extremes (natural predator 
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Note that while in the first two kinds of story the only negative effect of PP is the unintended one 
against future entry (the intended one against active rivals or actual entrants being nil), in reputation 
stories every new entry which is met by a predatory response further strengthens the incumbent’s 
reputation and thus has further deterrence effect. Consequently, this is the kind of predation which 
causes more troubles from the viewpoint of antitrust. Still, even in reputation models there is no 
relation between price and incumbent’s cost, thereby making the ATR and its variants totally 
irrelevant. More generally, preying-for-reputation, exactly like preying-for-signaling or preying-for-
jamming, is a pole apart from the yes-or-no character of straight tests like the ATR. Every behavior 
aimed at affecting a rival’s beliefs may vary quite a lot in breadth and intensity, but this makes it 
much harder for antitrust enforcers to detect it. Moreover, the fact that the welfare costs of PP are 
said to come more from dynamic inefficiency (deterrence of entry, which means undesirable 
obstacles to new investments and new products) than from static one (straightforward deadweight 
loss due to post-predation monopolization) makes the whole story much more debatable and the 
costs themselves extremely difficult to assess, if not purely virtual.  
Summing up, AIG reputation models suggest that predation is a real possibility: the lack of 
complete information can lead to an equilibrium where not only entry is deterred by predation, but 
predation has actually to occur. This result requires a set of conditions (Phlips 1988, 217-8), 
namely, that the predator be a multi-market firm which starts to predate after entry has occurred in 
one of its markets and whose predatory strategy is a price cut which brings the price below the non-
cooperative equilibrium level at which entry would be profitable for the entrant, thereby making 
entry value negative. Crucially, the prey must be unsure whether the price cut is predatory as she 
can interpret it as implying that entry is unprofitable under normal competitive conditions. This 
uncertainty is what makes the identification of predatory behavior a fortiori difficult for antitrust 
courts (ibid., 231).   
In the first half of the 1980s, a strong theoretical argument was developed showing that it was 
simply wrong (or, if you wish, bad economics) to argue that PP was necessarily irrational. It 
                                                                                                                                                                  
or “natural pacifist”), that once predation has begun in any market there is no reason why it should stop. An important 
paper by Easley, Masson and Reynolds (EMR) relaxed these assumptions, allowing for simultaneous entry in several of 
the monopolist’s markets in an AIG setting similar to that of reputation models (Easley, Masson & Reynolds 1985; on 
this model also see Phlips 1988, 211-217). In EMR story the monopolist may wish to prey only to gain extra time, that 
is, just to slow down entry in other markets, with full awareness that entry will eventually occur. The paper also 
explains why the incumbent may decide to stop preying after just one or two episodes. Above all, it gives the possibility 
– though not the certainty – to characterize different types of incumbent depending on the nature of the post-entry, non-
predatory equilibrium. In other words, the incumbent’s type is indistinguishable pre-entry and is only limitedly 
distinguishable post-entry, meaning that in some cases it is impossible to say whether the post-entry equilibrium price 
level is the outcome of a predation episode or of “normal” competition. The latter feature of EMR model is remarkable 
because it may account for the fact that, in practice, it is quite difficult for courts, businessmen and economists to 
distinguish a predatory from a normally competitive price (i.e., the price which would emerge in an ordinary, non-
cooperative equilibrium). 
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followed that predatory behavior did deserve the attention of antitrust law as it might well be a real 
world phenomenon. Though the argument was purely theoretical, it was marketed in terms of a 
bunch of plausible stories49 (signaling, jamming, and, above all, reputation-building) which could 
be verified against the facts of actual antitrust cases. What courts were ideally called to do was to 
look for evidence supporting one of those stories and, for the rest, trust game theory as far as the 
necessary relation between the story itself and the predatory character of the firm’s behavior was 
concerned. Above all, no costs had to be estimated and no bright-line rule could be applied. 
Contrary to Areeda & Turner’s operational urge, game theory showed that dealing with PP cases 
necessarily required that courts undertake the painstaking work of disentangling the litigation facts 
in order to bring to surface the outline of one or the other of AIG stories. 
 
 
§5. The AIG playbook in courts 
 
It is remarkable for our narrative that the first critiques against the AIG methodology came from 
two of the authors who had contributed to develop it. Milgrom & Roberts 1987 lists several issues 
which should be carefully assessed before applying their own models’ prescriptions to law 
enforcement. First of all, the assumption of equilibrium is much more demanding in AIG models 
than in traditional price-theoretic ones. According to Milgrom and Roberts, the latter are largely 
incomplete models, devoid as they are of any precise timing of actions, or description of the 
available information, or explicit modeling of out-of-equilibrium behavior, etc. Such 
incompleteness makes it easier to accept the equilibrium assumption because there would be little 
else on which to focus. Hence, vague stories of how and why equilibrium is achieved suffice in 
price-theoretic models (Milgrom & Roberts 1987, 187). On the contrary, AIG forces the theorist to 
be much more rigorous in her work: for example, no informal appeal to learning or adjustment to 
equilibrium can suffice because if there is repeated play in the game, this should be modeled 
explicitly. It follows that the equilibrium assumption is naturally more troublesome in those models 
– but this is hardly a defect, as it stems from their greater completeness (ibid., 188).   
The second problematic issue is the stronger rationality requirements. Milgrom and Roberts admit 
that AIG agents are much more sophisticated in their inferences, calculations and forecasts than in 
the price-theoretic world of competitive markets with given equilibrium prices (ibid.). While it is 
obvious that the rationality standard goes up as soon as we distance ourselves from the world of 
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 Recall Kauper (1992)’s “could test” mentioned in fn.37 above. Indeed, the Kodak decision, on which Kauper’s 
suggestion is founded, looked at that time quite promising to the supporters of a new approach to antitrust law based on 
theoretically plausible stories. More on Kodak below, §7.2. 
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perfect information, still what they call “a quantum leap” is entailed by the rationality assumption in 
AIG, namely, the ability to fully anticipate the other players’ complex responses, including the fact 
that those responses <<…depend on subtle inferences that competitors draw, often by very intricate 
reasoning, from their conjectures about others’ behavior and their observations.>> (ibid.). In short, 
agents in AIG models are called to solve much more difficult decision problems than in price-
theoretic ones. This in turn makes the equilibrium assumption much more implausible. Moreover, it 
is natural to conclude that <<…the descriptive accuracy of the super-rationality assumption does 
seem minimal.>> (ibid.).  
Yet, it is a third issue that is of utmost importance for our narrative. This has to do with the 
robustness of the AIG models’ results. Milgrom and Roberts underline <<…the apparent sensitivity 
of the results to alterations in what one might think is [the] fine structure of the models.>> (ibid., 
190). Indeed, the best AIG literature50 has demonstrated that introducing just <<…a tiny bit of 
private information into such a model can radically change its equilibrium outcomes…>> (ibid.). In 
a sense, the AIG technique is too powerful since by introducing the “right” amount of information 
asymmetry, one can show that <<…almost anything can be made an equilibrium.>> (ibid.). This 
result, formally proved by Fudenberg & Maskin (1986), belongs to the class of Folk Theorems and 
has ominous consequences in terms of the practical applicability of AIG models by  antitrust courts.  
Just to give a hint of what this entails (see §9 for further discussion), the result may be interpreted 
as indicating that PP is just one of the infinite possible equilibrium outcomes of a given strategic 
situation, namely, the one emerging when firms are attributed a very specific set of beliefs 
descending from a very specific kind of informational imperfection – precisely that set and that 
imperfection out of an infinite array of possibility. Borrowing from Milgrom and Roberts, one 
could then legitimately ask which of the infinite possibilities of information asymmetry have 
“survival value”, i.e., correspond to a situation (e.g. a distribution of predator’s types) to which 
competing firms ascribe a positive probability. Or, more succinctly, one could wonder whether AIG 
stories are really plausible or just conceptually possible.51    
Before digging more deeply on such a crucial issue, let’s go back to Milgrom and Roberts for a 
further questionable feature of AIG when viewed as a tool for antitrust law making. The models 
analyzed in §4 show the possible rationality of a behavior which is predatory in both intent and 
form, though not exactly the type of conduct traditionally termed “predatory” as it entails no 
necessary relation between a firm’s price and its production costs. Should this new specie of 
predatory behavior be of concern for antitrust law? As we said above, strategic predation can be 
socially costly because it deters future entry, although it may fail to eliminate current rivals. Hence, 
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 For economic models as merely “possible worlds” see Rappaport 1998, Ch.7. 
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Milgrom and Roberts concede that it would be good to prohibit it, if it could be correctly identified 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1990, 133). The problem is that, in order to identify it, we should be able to 
recognize what is a firm’s “right” price, where “right” means, in the AIG context, the price the firm 
would charge if the market and information conditions were such as to exclude any possibility to 
affect the rivals’ behavior or beliefs. Yet, determining such a price is, as Milgrom and Roberts 
recognize, a mind-boggling problem. Hence, their surprising conclusion:52 <<Doing so would 
surely cost more than any efficiency gain one might realize from reducing the height of dead-
weight-loss triangles. […] If so, it may be best simply to give up on attempts to control predation, 
even if one believes that it can and does occur.>> (ibid., 134).  
Let me summarize this argument as follows. The whole point of AIG is to show that PP may 
indeed be rational, but since PP bears no relation to costs (and thus to cost rules), it is impossible to 
identify it objectively and cheaply, hence it is better to ignore it as an antitrust violation. In short, 
game-theoretic models demonstrate that the only kind of rational predation is one no antitrust court 
or authority will ever be able to fight and detect! 
The same paradoxical conclusion may be reached if we consider how another early supporter of 
AIG,  Louis Phlips, describes the procedure through which a court should detect PP behavior in 
actual antitrust cases. Phlips admits that in the vast majority of cases, alleged predation is doubtful –   
itself hardly a surprise, given that strategic predation explicitly requires the existence of these 
doubts (Phlips 1988, 240-1). The only way a court may achieve a sufficient degree of certainty 
about a predation violation is by collecting evidence related to one of the AIG stories. The evidence 
need not be about whether the prey was forced out of the market or whether her cash flow remained 
positive. What should be proved  by either the plaintiff or the court is that the alleged predation 
turned a profitable entry opportunity into an unprofitable one. This, notes Philps, amounts to 
showing that, absent the incumbent’s price cut, there was room in the market’s normal competitive 
equilibrium for an additional firm as well as that, as a result of the cut, the market price went below 
the noncooperative (i.e., Nash) equilibrium level (ibid., 241).  
The point is that such a proof is extremely difficult to provide in practice for at least two reasons. 
First, because AIG show that predation may occur only when there is sufficient uncertainty about 
the low price being the outcome of normal competition or predatory behavior. Second, because the 
theoretical yardstick for discussing whether in the market there was room enough for an additional 
firm is the post-entry competitive equilibrium, with its implied price and market shares. But how 
may a court effectively compute this equilibrium given the necessarily incomplete information 
about costs and/or demand? Here Phlips is quite optimistic (or, one might say, just a dreamer) in 
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that he argues that real world firms are always capable of computing their own market’s Nash 
equilibrium. After all, he says, the noncooperative equilibrium is the “natural outcome” of imperfect 
competition under incomplete information. It follows that both the incumbent and the entrant should 
be able to say what the post-entry competitive price and market shares would have been in case of 
entry and no predation. The court should then just take this information and use it as the yardstick to 
evaluate the actual market performance (ibid.).  
This argument might be easily rejected by playing an Austrian tune and recalling – as in Demsetz 
1992, 215 – that the main reason why our societies rely on (and defend) competition is precisely 
because nobody can calculate what the equilibrium prices would be in its absence. But the real 
counter-argument to Phlips is much simpler than that. Leaving aside the firms’ actual possibility to 
compute it, it is sufficient to recognize that no court or judge would ever buy the idea that an 
esoteric concept like Bayesian-Nash equilibrium53 be the “natural outcome” of less-than-perfectly 
competitive markets, for the very simple reason that the rationality requirements behind this and 
similar solution concepts are far too strong to be taken seriously in any real life situation. Thus, at 
the very best, the complexity of game-theoretic models makes them unattractive to antitrust courts 
and judges eager for simple rules and worried about the risk of committing too many Type I errors, 
i.e., wrong condemnations of innocent, pro-competitive price cuts (see McChesney 2004, 51). 
Indeed, most Nash equilibrium refinements are, at best, just normative notions which show how 
ideal players, potentially capable of deploying the full power of their rationality, should behave (and 
reason) in specific strategic situations. They are, in Ariel Rubinstein’s terms, just fables.54 But if the 
kind of game theory behind AIG is just prescriptive, how could a given court or judge ever apply it 
when deciding a concrete antitrust case? 
That this has been the attitude of US antitrust courts may be easily demonstrated by looking at 
trial databases. According to Lexis, of the hundreds of federal cases dealing with PP indictments up 
to the year 2000,55 none ever mentioned Milgrom & Roberts or Kreps & Wilson or Benoit or 
Fudenberg & Tirole, or even Ordover & Saloner 1989’s survey on the game-theoretic approach to 
monopolization and antitrust. And even turning to the predation stories underlying AIG, what we 
find is just a handful of references (four or five overall) to either reputation or signaling. Recalling 
the immediate and huge impact of Areeda & Turner 1975 and its follow-ups (see above, §2), we 
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may conclude for the almost complete fiasco of AIG in affecting the way US antitrust courts handle 
PP cases.  
 
 
§6. Game over: Brooke and the triumph of Chicago School  
 
In the previous §§ we have explained how things radically (and quickly) changed in both the 
doctrinal environment and the lower courts’ attitude after the publication of Areeda & Turner 1975. 
It is now time to complete our story, by illustrating when and how the transformation reached the 
Supreme Court. The first application by the Supreme Court of the ideas emerging from the debate 
on the various price/cost rules came in 1986, with the Matsushita decision.56 There the Court 
endorsed the principle that a charge of predatory behavior had to be supported by evidence on the 
relationship between the defendant’s price and cost, along the lines of the post-ATR literature. 
Moreover, as a second requirement, the plaintiff had to show if and how the predator, after 
excluding its rival(s), could make up for the sacrifice of short-term profits suffered during the 
period of below-cost pricing – the so-called recoupment test, which a few years later became the 
hallmark of the crucial Brooke decision.57 
In the latter the Court did something unprecedented in antitrust cases, that is to say, it set aside a 
jury verdict based on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence,58 and explicitly declared that 
plaintiffs in a PP case must not only show that the defendant has a genuine possibility of preying 
the rival, by either forcing its exit or disciplining it, but also that the defendant has a strong prospect 
of recouping the losses suffered during predation.59 Specifically, the 1993 Court stated that, first, PP 
requires proof of below-cost pricing (though no specific cost rule was referred to)60 and, second, 
that PP requires proof of recoupment. Hence, below-cost pricing is just a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for monopolization. In order to satisfy the second requirement, plaintiffs must 
not only prove that below-cost pricing either excludes or disciplines the prey, but also that the 
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 It was just required that price be below <<…some measure of incremental cost.>> (Brooke, at 223). 
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predator will afterwards be able to raise the price above the competitive level and that this will 
compensate him for the losses of the predatory phase.  
The recoupment test itself entails two different elements of proof: the plaintiff must demonstrate 
not only that the successful predator has been, or will be, able to raise price above the competitive 
level (so-called recoupment capability), but also that the increase has been, or will be, sufficient to 
compensate the predator for its predatory losses (so-called recoupment sufficiency). Moreover, in 
order to prove the actual, or prospective, profitability of predation, plaintiffs are required by Brooke 
to demonstrate as a necessary precondition that the market structure is such as to potentially allow 
recoupment in the first place – something which in turn calls for, at the very least, a proof of 
structural features such as market concentration, existence of entry barriers and the predator’s 
capacity to absorb the prey’s market share (see Bolton et al. 2000, 2255-6). The accusation will be 
summarily dismissed absent the demonstration of the proper structural conditions, or of any other of 
the various prongs of what after 1993 has been called the Brooke test. Far from being inconsistent 
with, or in opposition to, the ATR and its variants, the recoupment test has actually provided 
defendants in PP cases with a second, alternative weapon: after 1993 a defendant can prevail in 
summary judgment by winning in either the recoupment or the price-cost part of the Brooke test 
(Hovenkamp 1996, 833).61 
What makes Brooke so important for our story is that it was the first time after the ATR 
“revolution” that the Court made its own views about PP fully explicit. These consisted in a strong 
skepticism about the robustness of predation claims, and a true sea-change from the Court’s earlier 
idea of competition as so fragile a process that it had to be protected by any significant price 
reduction operated by big firms.62 Indeed, the Brooke Court went much farther than the simple 
endorsement of either the ATR or one of its variants.63 Not even the observation of below-cost 
pricing, combined with the theoretical possibility of recouping (which, as we know, is by itself 
quite unlikely), should be considered sufficient to validate an accusation of predatory behavior if 
the proof of the actual likelihood of sustained supra-competitive pricing and recoupment were 
lacking. Hence, as noted by Kobayashi (2010, 44), the idea was explicitly rejected that the mere 
theoretical possibility of welfare harm could provide a basis for antitrust liability. The Court noted 
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 The fact itself of applying summary judgment to an antitrust case – a solution explicitly disfavored by the Supreme 
Court in Poller v. CBS, 368 US 467 (1962, at 473), heralded the sea-change in jurisprudential attitude towards antitrust 
violations: see on this Hovenkamp 1996, 822. In American law a summary judgment is a determination made by a court 
without a full trial. A party applying for summary judgment will try to persuade the court, via sworn statements and 
documentary evidence, that there are no material issues of fact remaining to be tried, as well as that the undisputed 
material facts require judgment to be entered in its favor. 
62
 See Boudreaux et al. 1995, 58. Glazer (1994, 606) notes that the Brooke plaintiff’s case was very strong, so much so 
that the decision, as well as the Court’s willingness to take a procedurally unusual step, says a lot about the latter’s 
general attitude towards PP.  
63
 Though Areeda and Turner themselves had briefly mentioned the recoupment test in their paper (see Aredda & 
Turner 1975, 698).  
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that, although the plaintiff’s economic expert had presented a theory of predatory price 
discrimination64 and affirmed his belief that, according to that theory, a reasonable possibility 
existed that the defendant’s behavior might have injured competition, <<…this does not alter our 
analysis. When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the 
law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it 
cannot support a jury’s verdict.>> (Brooke, at 242).65 
As we already know, the most visible outcome of Brooke has been that after 1993 no plaintiff has 
won a PP case at federal courts level – a conviction rate of 0% out of the 39 PP federal cases in the 
1993-2000 period. It is not hard to see why. As noted by Bolton et al. (2000, 2258-9), the 
combination of the exacting standard of proof set by the Brooke Court plus the theoretical 
skepticism that PP can ever be a plausible business strategy plus the judicial neglect of modern 
strategic theories of PP (of the kind analyzed in the previous §§) easily explains the plaintiffs’ 
miserable success rate after 1993, which in turn validated Glazer (1994, 633)’s dismal prophecy for 
the future of PP as an antitrust violation. In short, after Brooke price cuts made by dominant firms 
have once more become de facto legal in the US, as it had already happened in the immediate post-
ATR period.  
But where did the Brooke test come from? What brought the 1993 Court to completely reverse its 
1960s attitude? In particular, given that the role of the recoupment test is precisely to warrant that 
no PP accusation may end up deterring competitive behavior,66 where did the Court take the very 
idea that there may exist some competitive practices which, though potentially harmful, cannot be 
sanctioned without causing a bigger damage to other, surely pro-competitive conducts?   
The most obvious answer is that this view, first developed by the Court in Matsushita and then 
fully formalized in Brooke, marked the triumph in US antitrust law of the Chicago School. 
Evidence in favor of this interpretation is abundant in the two decisions. According to the 
Matsushita Court, predatory strategies are implausible in terms of economic theory because they are 
unlikely to work and especially costly when failing. It follows that, as McGee had already put it 
(see above, §2.4), <<…predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
successful.>> (Matsushita, at 589). Moreover, given that cutting prices in order to increase business 
is recognized as <<…the very essence of competition … >>, it turns out that <<… mistaken 
inferences in cases like this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect.>> (ibid., at 594). Thus, <<…if the factual context renders 
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 Recall that Brooke was a Robinson-Patnam case. See fn.59. 
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 The Court will play a similar tune a few days later in the Daubert decision: see below, §9. 
66
 According to Hovenkamp (1996, 836), proving that the possibility of recoupment is concrete is tantamount to saying 
that PP is rational behavior, and thus likely to occur in that specific situation. 
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respondents' claim implausible – if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense – 
respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would 
otherwise be necessary.>> (ibid., at 587). The point that validating loose PP accusations would risk 
deterring pro-competitive behavior is made even more forcefully by the Brooke Court: <<As a 
general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the 
lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is 
beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of 
chilling legitimate price cutting>> (Brooke, at 223).  
As we know well, the central argument of Chicago critique against PP was at the same time 
theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, starting from McGee 1958, Chicago main point 
had been precisely that, as a rational business strategy, PP was “rarely tried and even more rarely 
successful”; on the practical side, Chicago had warned that condemning a firm for cutting its price 
would send a terrible signal to the business world, deterring the most pro-competitive behavior of 
all. Accordingly, the Matsushita Court referred to <<…a consensus among commentators…>> that 
price predation is “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful”, quoting in support the full line-up 
of Chicago anti-PP classics, from McGee 1958 and 1980 to Bork 1978, from Koller 1971 to 
Easterbrook 1981, plus the ever-present Areeda & Turner 1975 (see Matsushita, at 589). 
From here it is just a small step to credit as the direct inspiration of the many hurdles set in front 
of a PP accusation by the Brooke Court one of Chicago main “articles of faith” (Crane 2009, 24), 
namely, the belief that courts and agencies are at best highly infirm when it comes to policing 
competition – to say it differently, that US antitrust law is founded on the principle that market 
processes are usually superior to legal or administrative processes at the task of allocating scarce 
resources. Consistently with this strong belief, antitrust law should proscribe only those behaviors 
which are flagrantly anti-competitive, leaving to other parts of the law (say, property, contract or 
tort law) and to incentive-guided market behavior the protection and enhancement of total welfare. 
The commonest interpretation is that both Matsushita and Brooke decisions just endorsed this point 
of view.  
It follows that the recoupment test was established as the functionally best screen for PP cases: 
asking whether recoupment is feasible under the plaintiff’s theory of predation is in fact a much 
simpler question than the – only apparently – straightforward one: “is the defendant’s price below 
an appropriate measure of its cost?” (see Boudreaux et al. 1995, 72). Recoupment analysis requires 
less information than price-cost comparisons because a single finding, such as “other competitors 
exist” or “entry in the market is easy” or “customers may undertake effective counterstrategies”, is 
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sufficient to invalidate the test and thus lead to the summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim –
leaving the final word to the market, in line with the core tenet of Chicago economics. 
The irony of Brooke67 is that the Court went so far in its decision and established so harsh a 
standard that plaintiff lost the case despite having substantially demonstrated that defendant had 
actually engaged in a successful predation strategy. This, according to Glazer (1994, 623), entailed 
a very un-Chicago claim of the superiority of the Court’s knowledge over that of market 
participants themselves. Indeed, the Brooke plaintiff accepted the need to prove a plausible 
recoupment scenario, presented evidence and expert testimony about the objective characteristics of 
the market showing how defendant could realistically recoup the losses of the predatory phase 
designed to discipline his rival, and even relied on documented market analysis by the defendant’s 
own management showing that the latter materially acted (by investing millions of dollars) on the 
belief that a predatory campaign would create a reasonable possibility of lessening competition – in 
short, the plaintiff had provided the Brooke Court with both the “story” and the “intent” (ibid., 625). 
The fact that it lost anyway means, among other things, that after Brooke courts need no longer 
defer to the informed judgment of market agents.68 This obviously clashes with the above-
mentioned “article of faith” of Chicago economics: <<…the Court’s willingness to assume that a 
sophisticated marketplace actor [the defendant] did not know what it was doing and was, in essence, 
acting irrationally is actually at odds with the Chicago School’s reliance on the wisdom of 
marketplace actors.>> (ibid., 626).69 So strong was the 1993 Court’s persuasion (fully in line with 
Chicago views) against the validity of PP claims that a finding of violation was precluded, no 
matter what the evidence might reveal about the defendant’s intent and behavior and no matter what 
the decision might entail for the broad issue of where market knowledge actually resides. 
 
 
§7. Killing games: part II and III 
 
The next pages deal with two other possible explanations of the post-1980 Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on PP cases, and in particular of its failure to take into account the novel ideas 
coming from game theory and the so-called Post-Chicago approach to antitrust.70 These are not 
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 At least according to the admittedly very partial reading of Glazer 1994: see above, fn.57. 
68
 <<Brooke Group gives courts license to ignore such evidence [about market agents’ knowledge] when it conflicts 
with their own convictions about what will happen in the marketplace. It tells them that they need not be influenced by 
the marketplace actors themselves.>> (Glazer 1994, 626). 
69
 To add further irony, the plaintiff, in the effort to uphold the relevance of the defendant’s beliefs and conduct, relied 
on the scholarship of no less than Chicago champion Frank Easterbrook (see Glazer 1994, 626, fn.103). 
70
 This name characterizes an approach to antitrust law and economics which aims at replacing  the Chicago School as 
the leading theoretical engine for the application of economic theory to competition policy and enforcement. The 
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intended to deny the validity of the most traditional explanation offered in the previous §, but rather 
to integrate it, by showing that the straightforward equation “Matsushita & Brooke = Chicago 
antitrust law and economics” does not tell the whole story.  
 
7.1 The first alternative reading is suggested by Bill Kovacic’s great 2007 paper in the Columbia 
Business Law Review (Kovacic 2007) and emphasizes the role played by three famous Harvard law 
scholars like Areeda, Turner and, above all, Stephen Breyer.71  
As noticed before, the recoupment notion had already been briefly mentioned by Areeda and 
Turner in their 1975 classic,72 and the paper itself was explicitly mentioned by the Supreme Court 
among the doctrinal sources of Matsushita. But according to Kovacic (2007, 48-9), even more 
influential on the latter decision has been then-judge Breyer’s 1983 ruling in Barry Wright73. There 
Breyer had explicitly endorsed the policy trade-off between the short and long term effects of 
predation which had animated the post-ATR debate (see above, §2). Yet, his “standard” concern 
with the possible deterrence of pro-competitive behavior caused by too strict an enforcement of 
anti-PP law did not stem in that decision from the same kind of preoccupations of Chicago 
economists, but rather from the very feeling that had motivated Areeda and Turner in 1975 (see 
above, §1), namely, the fear that courts and antitrust agencies often lacked the ability to handle 
difficult antitrust cases and, consequently, that antitrust law might suffer serious credibility blows 
from too many unsound decisions.74  
Kovacic claims that caution about the administrability of rules and the capacity of antitrust 
institutions to implement them have been the main contributions of Harvard Law School to modern 
US antitrust. Though sharing the general concern about deterrence effects,75 Harvard preoccupation 
was not identical to Chicago’s: while the latter had a theoretical (one would say, ideological) 
foundation in the alleged superiority of markets in allocating scarce resources with respect to every 
                                                                                                                                                                  
analytical backbone of the Post-Chicago approach is provided by game theory in general, and by AIG in particular. 
Baker 1989 is considered the informal manifesto of the approach. On Post-Chicago law and economics see for instance 
Cucinotta et al. 2002. 
71
 A Harvard law professor since 1967 and a judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals since 1980, Stephen G. Breyer 
has been appointed in 1994 as Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court.   
72
 See above, fn.63. At page 698 of Areeda & Turner 1975 we read that: <<…predatory pricing would make little 
economic sense to a potential predator unless he had […] … a very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in the 
predatory campaign will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed>>. 
73
 Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir., 1983). 
74
 In his tribute to the memory of Donald Turner, Breyer wrote that from the mid-1960s <<…it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that, to create coherent antitrust policy, reliance upon statute, precedent and instinct alone would 
not work. Unless informed by economics, disciplined with intellectual rigor, and administered with an understanding of 
industrial practicality, enforcement of the antitrust laws risked uncertainty, economic hardship, and injuring the very 
consumers they were meant to protect.>> (Breyer 1996, 725).  
75
 The passage of Breyer’s Barry Wright quoted by the Supreme Court is indeed that: <<[W]e must be concerned lest a 
rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition.>> (Matsushita, 594). 
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other institution, the former addressed the practical side of antitrust law enforcing. It follows that 
the Brooke test may be read, at least in part, as the outcome of Harvard scholars’ insistence that 
competition policy should take into account the limitations of US antitrust institutions, and thus 
give prominence to a few simple and fully operational principles which all courts and agencies may 
easily apply.76 
Kovacic’s thesis is confirmed by taking a closer look at Justice Breyer’s antitrust doctrine.77 First 
as a judge in the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit and then as a member of the Supreme Court, 
Breyer has always decided in antitrust cases in favor of bright-line rules and safe harbors whenever 
the benefits of exhaustive analysis using all the available economic tools would not justify the costs. 
Barry Wright is exemplary in this regard. In that ruling Breyer rejected an allegation of 
“unreasonably low price”, establishing a bright-line rule which – in the same spirit of ATR – 
effectively immunized from antitrust scrutiny any price which exceeded both incremental and 
average costs, thus providing a major channel for bringing Areeda and Turner’s proposal into 
mainstream antitrust jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court’s.  
In the same decision Breyer also rejected a Ninth Circuit test developed in another PP case which 
admitted that even a price exceeding average total cost could be predatory if it had been used 
strategically in order to discipline competition.78 Crucially, the test was not dismissed via a 
theoretical argument (say, because price theory proved that pricing above ATC could never harm 
consumers), but rather on the claim that any rare instance of possible welfare loss caused by such a 
price did not justify the costs of the fully-fledged rule of reason analysis required to undertake the 
test. Far from denying that antitrust enforcement could enormously benefit from the insights and 
rigor of economic theory, Breyer remarked that: <<…while technical economic discussion helps to 
inform the antitrust laws, those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes 
conflicting) views. For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which 
depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in 
courts and by lawyers advising their clients.>> (Barry Wright, at 234, emphasis added). These 
words immediately preceded the famous passage where Breyer argued that he did not want, for the 
sake of pursuing every economic complexity and qualification, to risk sacrificing the “bird in hand” 
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 This view is shared by Bruce Kobayashi, who argues that, far from pushing towards an accurate and economically 
sophisticated measure of the profit sacrifice incurred by an alleged predator, the Court’s real purpose in Brooke was to 
make clear that antitrust enforcers have to accept that their measurement tools are too imprecise to evaluate a firm’s 
business strategy without creating an intolerable risk of deterring pro-competitive behavior (Kobayashi 2010, 60-61). 
Here, according to Kobayashi, lies a possible explanation for the failure of sophisticated game-theoretic models to 
affect US courts’ attitude towards PP, a point we will return to in the following pages.  
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 See Greenfield & Matheson 2009. 
78
 Note that, in confirmation of the early development of (informal) strategic arguments, such a Ninth Circuit test 
actually predated AIG: see William Inglis & Sons Baking Co v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th 
Circuit, 1981), at 1035.   
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of above-cost price cuts, surely benefiting consumers in the short run, for the “bird in the bush” of 
possible lower prices in the long run (ibid.). Such a clear vision of the policy tradeoff, inevitable in 
every PP case, between sure short term gains and potential longer term gains has been very 
influential in US antitrust jurisprudence. Indeed, themes from Breyer’s First Circuit opinions have 
profoundly affected some of the most significant Supreme Court’s antitrust decisions over the last 
twenty years.79  
The suggested interpretation finds further support in Breyer’s voting pattern as a Supreme Court 
Justice (he joined the Court in 1994). An institutionalist perspective on the comparative competence 
in decision-making and an overall leaning towards technocracy seem to motivate his decisions. For 
example in Trinko80 he concurred with Justice Scalia’s opinion in expressing a preference for 
regulatory decision making by administrative agencies, rather than antitrust enforcement by 
generalist judges, on account of the superior competence of the former with respect to the latter. In 
Leegin81 his dissent in favor of rules rather than standards was motivated on the ground that juries 
may have difficulty in applying open-ended, economically dense standards.  
One may legitimately ask whether Justice Breyer’s rule-based antitrust jurisprudence is merely 
synonymous with pro-defendant. The answer is negative, as Breyer’s actual message in Barry 
Wright was just that definite rules should be applied in appropriate cases – a message which does 
not necessarily lead to systematically pro-defendant outcomes in antitrust litigations. The real issue 
upon which Breyer has exercised his enormous influence is that a court’s choice between bright-line 
rules and more open-ended inquiries (aka, stories) should turn on considerations which have 
nothing to do with the problem of whether a given conduct (say, a price cut) is or is not anti-
competitive. As he famously said in another First Circuit decision: <<We shall take into account of 
the institutional fact that antitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear enough for 
lawyers to explain them to clients. They must be administratively workable and therefore cannot 
always take account of every complex economic circumstance or qualification.>> (Town of 
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 1st Circuit, 1990, at 22). What matters most here, 
Breyer’s opinions seem to have little to do with the Harvard vs. Chicago controversy which 
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 Starting from the early 1990s, the Court has ruled in favor of defendants in an unbroken line of antitrust case. Several 
of these decisions adopted a “safe harbor” approach protecting the defendant’s conduct which was clearly inspired by 
the Barry Wright doctrine. For example, the Matsushita Court cited the “bird in hand” principle to emphasize the 
dangers of mistaken inferences in PP litigations. The Court then reiterated the same concern in Cargill and, later, in 
Brooke. Even the controversial – and eventually withdrawn – Section 2 Report by the US Department of Justice, which 
aimed at harmonizing the DOJ enforcement of anti-monopolization statutes with the most widely accepted legal 
doctrine and economic theory (Department of Justice 2008), echoed many of the themes of Breyer’s jurisprudence and 
quoted Barry Wright more than ten times. 
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 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 US 398 (2004). 
81
 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 US 877 (2007). 
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constitutes in so many historical reconstructions the main driving force of the evolution of the last 
30-40 years of US antitrust law.82 
7.2 The other alternative reading of Matsushita and Brooke hinges upon the internal logic of 
Supreme Court’s decisions. The reconstruction starts from 1984, when the Court argued in 
Monsanto83 − a §1 conspiracy case – that a single piece of circumstantial evidence which could 
have resulted from either a conspiracy or independent behavior was insufficient for a plaintiff to 
survive a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.84 The general principle was that, for a 
plaintiff to defeat a motion for a directed verdict85 under a claim of concerted price fixing, evidence 
had to be presented, either direct or circumstantial, that “tends to exclude the possibility” that the 
alleged conspirators acted independently (Monsanto, at 753). In other words, whenever the 
circumstantial evidence produced by the plaintiff might have been caused by pro-competitive 
behavior, the Court required that the “tends to exclude” principle be satisfied in order to avoid 
deterring firms from undertaking a legitimate, pro-efficiency behavior.86 
The Monsanto principle reveals that the “avoid chilling competitive behavior” argument pre-dates 
Matsushita. In his masterful study of the latter decision, Nickolai Levin underlines that the  
principle itself may well have been the outcome of the rise of Chicago antitrust scholarship, as well 
as of the Court’s Harvard-style desire to employ economics in order to revive and strengthen 
antitrust law (Levin 2005, 1630). Yet, he also underlines that later decisions, such as Matsushita, 
should be read first and foremost as the Court’s effort to delimit and clarify the meaning of the 
Monsanto principle. In particular, Matsushita should be seen as the effort to extend the principle to 
a summary judgment context in PP cases. As the Court put it:  
 
<<To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of [Sherman Act] §1 must present evidence that “tends to exclude the 
possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Respondents […] must show that 
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 See Crane 2009, 10-11. Concerning Trinko, Kovacic (2007, 67-8) underlines how the ideas contained in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion are hardly the outcome of Chicago School thinking alone (allegedly championed in the Court 
by Scalia himself) and should be more correctly considered the product of a Scalia/Breyer collaboration. 
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 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 US 752 (1984). 
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 Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a type of judgment in American courts whereby the presiding judge in a civil 
jury trial may overrule the decision of a jury and reverse or amend their verdict. In literal terms, the judge enters a 
verdict notwithstanding the jury findings. This intervention permits the judge to exercise discretion to avoid extreme 
and unreasonable jury decisions and occurs when the judge believes there were insufficient facts on which to base the 
jury's verdict, or that the latter did not correctly apply the law. The procedure is similar to a situation in which a judge 
orders a jury to arrive at a particular verdict, called a directed verdict (see next fn.). 
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 A directed verdict is an order from the judge presiding over a jury trial that one side or the other wins. Typically, the 
judge orders a directed verdict after finding that no reasonable jury could reach a decision to the contrary. 
86
 <<It is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice 
restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since, under present law, the latter are subject to per se 
treatment and treble damages.>> (Monsanto, at 763). Also see Levin 2005, 1630-1. 
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the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent 
action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents.>>  
(Matsushita, at 587-8, emphasis added).  
 
Hence, a new requirement of “reasonable in the light of competing inferences” was developed by 
the Court, which immediately applied it to the PP case under scrutiny: cutting prices being the very 
essence of competition, there obviously existed a possible inference of pro-competitive behavior in 
the light of the observed price reduction, so much so that the motion for summary judgment could 
not be survived by the Matsushita plaintiff.  
A few lines before the above-quoted passage, the Court had also argued that: <<…if the factual 
context renders respondents’ claim implausible − if the claim is one that simply makes no economic 
sense − respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than 
would otherwise be necessary.>> (ibid., at 587). The combination of the two passages leads Levin 
to read into the new, “reasonable in the light of competing inferences” principle the Court’s 
clarification that the Monsanto “tends to exclude” doctrine also applies to plausible allegations: 
even in front of a plausible inference of antitrust violation, there may still exists a pro-competitive 
explanation of the same behavior.  
Levin’s remark is crucial for our narrative. Not surprisingly, these two key passages immediately 
precedes the fourth section of Matsushita decision (pp.589 ff.), namely, the pages where the Court 
openly addressed Chicago scholarship in order to explain why PP schemes had to be considered 
implausible on the basis of rigorous economic theory. As argued by Levin (2005, 1632), with the 
explicit reference to Chicago doctrine, the Matsushita Court set forth a new definition of 
“reasonableness”: starting from 1986 the term “reasonable” incorporates what Levin calls “a case-
external dimension”, that is to say, the idea that the reasonableness of any specific inference in an 
antitrust case also depends on how permitting the inference might affect, or deter, market 
competition in general. It is in this specific sense that Matsushita is commonly said to have 
established a gate-keeping role for courts in antitrust cases (Crane 2007, 77): judges and juries are 
required to assess the reasonableness of plaintiff’s inferences and in doing so they also have to take 
into account the external effect on social welfare and market efficiency of either admitting or not a 
certain inference. 
Although the new dimension of reasonableness is confirmed by the several Circuit courts which, 
using the gate-keeping power granted them by Matsushita, have limited admissible inferences of 
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harmful business behavior,87 Levin’s study shows that the interpretation of the joint Monsanto-
Matsushita principle is still an open issue in American law. Does the “tends to exclude” 
requirement applies to all antitrust cases? Or does it apply only to implausible inferences? Or does it 
apply only when there is a significant risk of deterring pro-competitive behavior? Take the second 
(“implausibility only”) reading. This would fit nicely with how the Matsushita Court thought of PP 
stories, inasmuch as, by following Chicago doctrine, predation turns out to be a strategy that no 
rational, profit-maximizing firm would ever pursue. Yet, recalling that, by its own words, the Court 
extended the Monsanto principle to plausible inferences, it is the third (“deterrence only”) reading 
which seems more respectful of the Court’s decisions, as the latter aimed at establishing a 
precautionary requirement against the case-external risk of causing welfare losses by chilling pro-
competitive behavior. 
The latter reading also seems consistent with another Supreme Court decision in Kodak.88 Despite 
being a case of tying, Kodak deserves a place in our story because it marks the first (and the only, to 
date) time the Court has admitted into its reasoning an argument based on the notion of imperfect 
information. As we know, information problems are at the heart of the AIG-based PP stories; more 
generally, they represent the gist of the whole Chicago vs. Post-Chicago debate. In a nutshell, while 
the Chicago School believes that information-based issues in market competition should better be 
left to contract law, i.e., to the firms’ ability to protect themselves through contracts, Post-Chicago 
scholars argue that, on account of their negative effects on competition, imperfect information 
problems must be placed at center stage of antitrust law. This divergence hinges upon a deep 
theoretical issue, namely, the role of information problems in the analytical core of the two 
viewpoints, respectively, price theory and game theory. 
In Kodak, the Court seemingly – and quite surprisingly – sided with Post-Chicago in that it argued 
that imperfect information alone may suffice to destroy an otherwise competitive market. Thus the 
Court effectively equated imperfect information to other, more traditional anti-competitive features, 
such as a big market share (see Lande 1993, 194-5). Moreover, the decision established the 
imperfections in information as a crucial element for defining the relevant market in any given 
antitrust case, since their very existence may significantly narrow the extent of the market (for 
example, by preventing customers from turning to potential substitutes of whose existence they may 
just be unaware: ibid., 197).   
Kodak quickly became the subject of a hot debate which still goes on among US antitrust 
scholars. The decision – and its possible extensive interpretation – were  immediately recognized as 
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 For a partial list of PP cases see e.g. Crane 2007, 78, fn.122. Crane notes that the gate-keeping role has been mainly 
exercised in cases involving the application of per se rules, first and foremost PP cases.  
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 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc., 504 US 451 (1992). 
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capable of shaking the entire antitrust world. According to Kauper (1993, 359), Kodak <<…does 
reflect an unwillingness [of the Court] to be governed by the rational consumer teachings of the 
price theorists across the board…>>. Another early commentator, Robert Lande, praised it as “a 
punch on Chicago’s chin”,89 and identified a list of antitrust areas which might well be 
revolutionized by the Court’s new ideas (Lande 1993, 198 ff.). Not surprisingly, these were the 
areas where Chicago influence had been felt more strongly starting from the mid-1975, and even 
less surprisingly PP featured prominently among them.90 In the following years Kodak has become 
the flagship of Post-Chicago antitrust, as the adherents to this approach have seen it as the best 
weapon to start demolishing the Chicago fortress.  
The reactions against Kodak have been equally strong. A prominent, non-Chicago antitrust 
scholar has argued that the decision is no less than <<…a failed experiment in a type of economic 
engineering where antitrust has no place…>>, something which would transform antitrust <<into a 
free-ranging engine for repair of any contract that either deceives or has not taken every possible 
contingency into account.>> (Herbert Hovenkamp, as quoted by Crane 2009, 13 and 14). Yet, the 
real issue for our narrative is to note that Kodak has been at the same time the only imperfect-
information-based Supreme Court’s decision and the last plaintiff victory in a Supreme Court’s 
antitrust case to date. Thus, it seems the Court has clearly refused to embrace the extended 
interpretation of that decision suggested by Lande and other commentators. How to explain then the 
Court’s sole incursion into the realm of imperfect information? Where did this decision actually 
come from? Why it had no follow-ups, at least at the highest Court’s level? 
To answer these questions we refer once more to Levin 2005, who reinterprets Kodak as an 
outcome of the Court’s internal logic, in particular of its effort to clarify the extent of the 
Monsanto/Matsushita principle. As it turns out, this interpretation also leads to a new reading of 
Brooke, which would in turn represent the Court’s solution to the issues raised by Kodak. Rather 
than embodying the judicial byproduct of the epic clash among competing law and economics 
schools (Harvard, Chicago, Post-Chicago), the whole sequence Monsanto – Matsushita – Kodak – 
Brooke would thus represent the physiological outcome of the evolution, and clarification, of the 
Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence.  
Levin (2005, 1632) starts from the 1992 Court’s explicit remark that Matsushita <<…did not 
introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antirust cases […] Matsushita 
demanded only that the nonmoving party’s inferences be reasonable…>> (Kodak, at 468). Hence, 
the Court refused to limit the range of plausible inferences beyond those pertaining to cases where 
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 Yet, although he did refer to the predator’s possibility to strategically modify its rivals’ expectations, not even Lande 
mentioned any AIG paper or result in support (1993, 200). 
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the defendant’s behavior <<…appears always, or almost always, to enhance competition.>> (ibid., 
at 479).91 But if Matsushita placed no special burden on plaintiffs, nor expressed a favor for 
defendants in antitrust cases, it follows that the specific refusal to grant summary judgment to 
defendant Eastman Kodak was justified by the circumstance that the latter’s behavior was not 
sufficiently competitive on its face: << We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply 
not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a 
legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh 
the risk of deterring pro-competitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal 
behavior will go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.>> (ibid.). 
In short, according to Levin, what the Kodak Court tried to do was just to give a specific solution 
to the procedural issue left open by Matsushita, namely, “how often” an observed business behavior 
had to be pro-competitive in order to trigger the inference limitation of the original Monsanto 
principle and thus lead a court to “shut the gate” in the plaintiff’s face. The answer was that it was 
not sufficient for the behavior to be generally more favorable than harmful to competition, because 
the principle of limitation could be invoked only when the behavior was “always, or almost always” 
pro-competitive.92 Remarkably, the Court considered cutting prices to be precisely one such case, 
and thus classified PP as a paradigmatic example of – to borrow Levin’s term – theoretical 
implausibility, i.e., of an inference which might even be factually plausible were it not for current 
economic theory clearly indicating that it was very unlikely correct (Levin 2005, 1695).93 If Levin 
is right, then it is probably incorrect to read too much into Kodak as far as the Chicago vs. Post-
Chicago theoretical controversy is concerned – and even less so with respect to the possibility (or 
desirability) for AIG-based analysis of PP to gain access to courtrooms.94 
The limited impact of Kodak on later antitrust decisions by the Supreme Court is demonstrated by 
the next case it had to deal with, i.e., Brooke.95 Suffices to note that Brooke’s hallmark, the 
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 On the circumstance that the Kodak Court’s “nod toward standard” (read: towards plausible stories and away from 
bright line rules) has been ignored by the Court itself in more recent §2 cases, see Crane 2007, 67-8. Crane also 
investigates the impact of Kodak-based new penchant for standards at lower courts’ level: see ibid., 70. 
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recoupment test, established a sharp differentiation between PP and every other instance of 
exclusionary conduct. In the latter (like e.g. the alleged tying in Kodak), the inference of injury to 
competition may be drawn by looking just at the conduct itself and at market structure. In predation 
cases – and only in them – a further requirement need be satisfied in order to obey Brooke. The fact 
that an accusation of PP was seen by the 1993 Court as the only instance of “investment in the 
creation of market power” by a dominant firm which called forth a much tighter standard of proof 
may thus be read as the Court’s willingness to clarify that Kodak’s reasoning did not apply to PP 
cases.96 In any case, we are miles away from the optimistic claim that Kodak be exemplar of the fact 
that: <<When modem theory [read: imperfect information theory] has been properly briefed to the 
Supreme Court in other types of antitrust cases and when convincing factual evidence supports the 
predatory or exclusionary theory, the Court has been willing to follow modern theory.>>.97 
 
 
§8. A game saver? 
 
In the previous §§ we have offered three possible explanations for Brooke. Yet, regardless of 
whether the decision should be seen as a manifestation of the triumph of Chicago School price 
theory or as an outcome of a Harvard-style concern for administratively feasible rules or as an 
application of the Monsanto/Matsushita principle of reasonable inferences – or probably as the 
result of all the three combined – the fact remains that after 1993 no plaintiff has ever won anymore 
a PP antitrust case at Federal courts level.98 This is all the more significant given the recent trend in 
US antitrust courts to favour standards over rules (see Crane 2007), although the Brooke principle 
itself may best be depicted as not a pure rule-like one, but rather as a combination of a rule-like part 
(the price-cost rule) plus a standard-like part (the recoupment test, entailing a structural analysis). 
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 Of particular import among recent decisions is the summary judgment against the Department of Justice in United 
States vs. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). The judgment came on account of the government’s inability to 
meet the requirements of Brooke. Moreover, the government’s reputation theory of predation was explicitly dismissed 
at the district court level as “subjective and unverifiable”. See Crane 2007, 71, and Monti 2007, 72-3.  
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Yet, some IO economists did not let Brooke go unchallenged. What sounded totally unacceptable 
to them was that the Supreme Court had authoritatively endorsed Chicago-style price theory just 
when the game-theoretic approach was replacing it as the hard core of mainstream economics in 
general, and of modern IO in particular. Historically speaking, the critique was well taken. Indeed, 
it may be argued that even before the game-theoretic revolution Chicago price theory had never 
achieved in economics the same status and success that it has enjoyed in courtrooms. Leading IO 
economist Stephen Martin has vigorously claimed that economics in general, and industrial 
economics in particular, never considered Chicago so-called “tight prior equilibrium method” and 
its implication, the static, non-strategic approach to competition, as mainstream. Far from 
representing the method of economic theory, Chicago economics has always been considered an 
idiosyncratic version of the neoclassical theory of perfectly competitive markets, of hardly any 
utility in the analysis of imperfect competition and antitrust (see Martin 2007).  
Regardless of the historical validity of Martin’s claim, it is a no-brainer that since the mid-1980s 
the advent and quick rise to dominance of game theory set the record straight in the marketplace of 
ideas: strategic reasoning has become the way of doing IO analysis. Yet, in the last three decades 
many US antitrust courts have considered Chicago views as representative of the whole IO 
community. In the subfield of price predation, and at the highest judicial level, this attitude is 
epitomized by the Brooke decision.   
In reaction to that trend, economists Patrick Bolton and Michael Riordan and law scholar Joseph 
Brodley have published a few years after Brooke an important paper aimed at re-proposing the case 
for a game-theoretic approach to PP in a way which could make it acceptable by US courts (Bolton 
et al. 2000; BBR henceforth). The central question of the paper is how to solve the tension between 
legal decisions like Brooke and the outcomes of modern economics. BBR correctly identify the 
main reason behind the judicial skepticism on PP in the assumption of perfect information 
underlying the kind of economic models which, more or less explicitly, courts seem to follow when 
deciding over predation charges (BBR 2000, 2249). As we know, the assumption was typical of the 
static, non-strategic approach to PP which led the way until the late 1970s. According to BBR, 
courts still adhere to this approach, wrongly believing that it still mirrors the economists’ 
consensus. What courts seem to ignore is that such a consensus does not exist anymore (if it ever 
existed at all), because modern IO models are, at the same time, more sophisticated and more 
realistic in that they assume imperfect information and build around it plausible predation stories 
(ibid.).99  In particular, the authors complain that the Brooke Court omitted from its analysis of 
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recoupment any consideration of strategic issues (ibid., 2258), totally neglecting the new game-
theoretic models which explain PP as a potentially profitable strategy in a dynamic world of 
imperfect information.  
Consistently with this view, BBR offer a new, more general and strategic-oriented definition of 
PP as <<…a price reduction that is profitable only because of the added market power the predator 
gains from eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or 
potential rival. […] a predatory price is a price that is profit-maximizing only because of its 
exclusionary or other anti-competitive effects.>> (BBR 2000, 2242-3). Yet, they also admit that this 
and similarly economics-based definitions are not operational in terms of applicable legal rules. 
Hence they propose a five-step approach which aims at being, at the same time, i) faithful to 
modern IO economics, ii) consistent with Brooke doctrine, and, iii) fully operational for courts.  
Taking the lead from Joskow & Klevorick 1979 (see above, §2.2), the five steps are divided in 
two tiers. The first tier, which operates as a screening device, contains three steps: 1) prove the 
existence of a market structure facilitating PP, 2) prove the plausibility of a predation scheme, 3) 
prove the probability of recoupment. Only when the first tier has given positive answers to all three 
steps, i.e., only for those cases surviving the first-tier scrutiny, the court should move to the second 
tier, which requires more exacting proofs: 4) prove that price is below cost, 5) prove there is no 
efficiency defense justifying the predator’s behavior.100 The advantage of a two-tiered approach is 
that, in the same spirit of Brooke, it allows cases to be eliminated via the examination of less 
resource-consuming factors, i.e., before requiring expensive proofs about the firm’s costs or its 
efficiency justifications. Moreover, the three steps in the first tier are fully consistent with the 
necessary conditions for a PP trial established by the Brooke Court (BBR 2000, 2264).  
The most important steps for us are the second and third. According to Brooke, to reach proof of 
PP and recoupment plaintiff must show that predation is plausible ex ante and probable ex post (see 
above, §6). BBR argue that ex ante plausibility may be demonstrated by proving the existence of  a 
predatory scheme, i.e., by giving enough evidence supporting a credible story of predation.101 But, 
where can the plaintiff look for such a story? BBR’s answer is straightforward: modern game theory 
has provided a whole playbook of possible predatory schemes (see above, §4). It follows that a 
plaintiff providing evidence in support of one of those strategic stories of PP could legitimately 
claim that her argument rests on the rigorous foundations of mainstream economics (ibid., 2266-7). 
As to ex post probability, BBR argue that it may be shown by proving either that one or more rivals 
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have been excluded from the market or at least that post-predation market conditions exist which 
make future recoupment likely. In order to prove the latter, BBR suggest a cost standard, like 
Baumol’s AIC or Joskow & Klevorick’s AAC (ibid., 2271-2; see above, §2.2-3).102  
The philosophy behind BBR’s proposal is clear. The only way to reconcile modern economics 
with current legal doctrine is to go back to a rule of reason approach, though policed by a cost 
rule.103 The element of novelty comes from the way rule of reason analysis should be undertaken. 
Rather than chasing evidence about the ambiguous notion of predatory intent, the analysis should be 
guided by, and search for, the elements of one of those PP stories told by the game-theoretic 
literature. This would capture what the authors consider a peculiarity of predation as an antitrust 
violation, namely, its being too multi-faceted a phenomenon to be identified by a single factor or 
behavior (say, a single cost rule). In this respect BBR argue that, despite its “strategic” inclination 
(see above, §2), the whole post-ATR literature missed the point, with the only exception of 
Schmalensee 1979, who indeed suggested that the most proper approach to PP should be a case-by-
case analysis, capable each time of selecting the particular economic model which happens to fit the 
factual circumstances of the specific case (ibid., 2252). 
Before examining the critiques raised against BBR proposal, let me point out an internal 
inconsistency in their argument. Much as Milgrom and Roberts had done before, BBR identify in 
McGee 1958 the theoretical pillar of the exceedingly lenient, if not entirely laissez faire, approach 
followed by US antitrust courts vis-à-vis PP charges. That paper is said to epitomize the Chicago 
price-theoretic view, with the crucial assumption of perfect information being the key to explain 
why there is no room for PP as a rational business strategy in static, non-strategic models: <<For a 
long time, McGee’s analysis provided the only coherent economic theory of predatory pricing. 
While some resisted McGee’s conclusion that predatory pricing was irrational, no rival theory 
emerged.>> (ibid., 2244). This statement is clearly instrumental to BBR’s thesis that the real 
problem behind so many pro-defendant decisions be strictly theoretical, so much so that it might be 
solved only by summoning in courtrooms a better kind of theory, namely, game theory. But we 
already know that, far from ever being “for a long time” the “only coherent economic theory” of 
PP, McGee 1958 was even less accepted by courts, which almost completely ignored it. More than 
that, BBR themselves betray their own statement, as they claim that what they call <<the populist 
era of predatory pricing enforcement>> ended abruptly not because of McGee’s paper, but rather 
because of Areeda & Turner 1975. They say that: <<The enforcement climate changed radically in 
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1975 upon the publication of the Areeda-Turner article>> (ibid., 2250), and then offer data about 
PP convictions confirming the U-turn (see above, §2.1). Given the Harvard affiliation of both Philip 
Areeda and Donald Turner, it is rather curious that BBR attribute them the raise to dominance 
among PP courts of Chicago price theory!  
Much more than an historical quibble is at stake here. By emphasizing the purely theoretical 
foundations of the mistaken doctrine followed by post-1975 courts, BBR seem to neglect the real 
reason behind the ATR success, namely, its being a simple, fully operational rule. In other words, 
that it wasn’t McGee 1958, but rather Areeda & Turner 1975, who really turned the tables of PP 
enforcement did not depend on analytical issues – or, for that matter, on the Chicago vs. Harvard 
controversy – but first and foremost on the courts’ eagerness to adopt a bright-line rule capable of 
restoring the credibility of antitrust enforcing after so many years of discredited rulings in PP cases. 
Under this respect, the Brooke doctrine just put an authoritative – and long overdue – seal upon a 
well established attitude.104   
The implications of BBR’s incomplete reconstruction are wider than expected. If the real 
motivation behind the new, post-1975 attitude of US courts was practical, rather than theoretical, 
serious doubts may be raised about the concrete possibility of BBR’s appeal to the “right theory” – 
i.e., AIG – to persuade courts to modify their approach. If what judges and juries long for are 
simple, ready-to-use rules, any proposal calling for a return to fully-fledged rule of reason analysis, 
including the necessity to trace the evidence supporting complicated stories of strategic predation, is 
condemned to irrelevance, regardless of its own theoretical merits. This kind of mistake has 
frequently spoiled PP literature. For example, we now that some of the critics of the ATR 
committed it, though others did not (see above, §2). It is the same mistake made by the early 
generation of AIG theorists, though again more acute authors like Milgrom and Roberts were 
somehow aware of it (see above, §5). Above all, it is the very mistake which most clearly accounts 
for the failure of game theory to have any effective influence upon PP legal doctrine. It wouldn’t 
take long for the critics of the game-theoretic approach to IO in general, and to predation issues in 
particular, to point this out. 
 
 
§9. Judges don’t play – should they? 
 
The reaction to BBR’s proposal was almost immediate. University of Virginia economists Kenneth 
Elzinga and David Mills penned a spicy reply where they argued that: <<Although strategic 
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theories of predatory pricing are exemplary in their coherence and rigor, their potential to add value 
to antitrust policy is much more modest than [BBR] admit.>> (Elzinga & Mills 2001, 2475). What 
game theorists achieved was to identify sufficient conditions for complete and internally consistent 
stories explaining why a rational firm endowed with monopoly power could profitably make 
recourse to PP. By doing that, the strategic approach was complementary, rather than alternative, to 
standard price theory. Indeed, no author working in the latter tradition ever argued that PP was 
always irrational, but only that the conditions making it a profitable business strategy were quite 
improbable as well as that the means to detect this kind of violation would be overtly expensive and 
difficult to apply. In this respect, game theory did manage to reformulate some of the existing loose 
stories of PP and give them more consistency and plausibility (ibid., 2476-7).  
However, Elzinga and Mills remark that the predictions which may be drawn from such game-
theoretic reformulations are far too sensitive to the underlying assumptions. Hence, the new PP 
stories may apply only to <<…factual situations that fit the theory’s stringent requirements.>> 
(ibid., 2477). Hence, we are back to step one, because in order to apply these stories courts need 
first to prove that facts support them. For example, a court would first have to show that the 
asymmetry in either information or financial resources – necessary for a dominant firm to prey the 
rival by successfully misleading her beliefs – actually exists in the case’s actual circumstances. But 
this is exactly what price theorists have always admitted (say, in the deep pocket story).  
Strategic stories only make things worse in this respect. First, because they impose a higher 
standard of judging given the intrinsic fragility of their prescriptions (just think of how a game 
equilibria may drastically vary as a consequence of slight variations in the assumptions). Here BBR 
fail to <<…acknowledge that proving a more demanding theory calls for a more discriminating 
factual inquiry.>> (ibid., 2475). Second, because the key assumption of many of these models 
which must be empirically proven, namely, the informational asymmetry (the “incumbent-know-
best assumption”, as Elzinga and Mills call it), is actually unobservable or unverifiable.105 Third, 
one should also be sceptical about the overly simplified market structure underlying all game-
theoretic models of PP where the asymmetry between firms is magnified ad hoc. Again, while a PP 
story may well be plausible in a stylized market, it may not necessarily be so in a more complex 
setting, closer to real world ones (ibid., 2478).  
BBR proposal is also questionable under the procedural side. According to its supporters, a 
plausible game-theoretic story supported by some ex ante evidence on market structure and the likes 
should suffice to prove predation in court, with little if no role left for ex post – i.e., after the price 
cut – evidence. Yet, one might legitimately wonder what BBR would suggest when the market 
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structure and performance do not fit ex post the ex ante inferences of injury to competition. This, 
according to Elzinga and Mills, is what actually happened in some crucial cases, where either the 
FTC’s or the Supreme Court’s cautious behavior with respect to PP allegations has been vindicated 
by ex post market developments (ibid., 2486). Among them features <<…the poster child for the 
game theoretic approach…>> to predation, i.e., the 1984 General Foods coffee case106 where ex 
post data clearly showed that <<… had game theoretic interpretations persuaded the FTC to restrain 
[General Foods]’s aggressive pricing, coffee drinkers and competition would have been injured, not 
the other way round.>> (ibid., 2489). 
In short, the prescriptions stemming from the game-theoretic approach have no general analytical 
value and little practical use: <<Strategic theories of predatory pricing are pristine theoretical 
existence proofs. Their value lies in identifying sufficient theoretical conditions for predatory 
pricing to arise as an equilibrium outcome.>> (ibid., 2493-4). The new models answer the question: 
<<When, as a matter of economic theory, can predatory pricing occur?>>, but this, as Elzinga and 
Mills note, is not the relevant question antitrust courts have to answer – the latter actually being, 
first, <<Under market conditions actually observed, is predatory pricing the most plausible 
explanation for an episode of low prices?>>, and, second, <<Are these conditions distinguishable 
from legitimate competition in the market?>> (ibid., 2479). As these questions clearly show, 
enforcement of PP law is a practical issue of “is”, not a theoretical issue of “can”.107   
We devoted so much room to Elzinga & Mills 2001 because it is exemplary of the empirical and 
theoretical objections raised by economists and law scholars against the strategic approach to PP. 
Their critique concerning the unobservability or unverifiability of the crucial “incumbent-know-
best” assumption aptly summarizes the doubts raised in the literature about the alleged higher 
realism of game-theoretic models with respect to price-theoretic ones. Other examples in this 
vein108 are the scepticism about the heavy burden of rationality required for firms to calculate their 
equilibrium strategies or the concern about the extreme fragility of the equilibrium itself, 
symbolized by the Folk Theorem for AIG (see §5). The theorem’s thesis that there always exists a 
context (formally, a set of beliefs) within which one can tell a plausible strategic story of PP depicts 
an “anything goes” environment which makes the approach itself unacceptable in courtrooms.  
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The argument may be summarized by saying that game theory cannot suggest the certainty, or 
even the plausibility, of a certain outcome, but just its logical possibility.109 As Sam Peltzam noted 
when reviewing the 1989 Handbook of Industrial Organization, what game-theoretic IO models 
amount to is <<… an almost interminable series of special cases>>, whose conclusions <<…tend to 
be very sensitive to the way problems are defined and to the assumptions that follow.>> (Peltzman 
1991, 206). The very same flexibility of strategic models which lies behind their enormous success 
in modern IO makes them less apt to produce robust predictions, and thus eventually explains their 
inability to influence antitrust courts.110    
The problem is particularly acute in the case of imperfect or incomplete information models, like 
AIG ones, which require some structure on the beliefs of the market participants. Indeed, there 
always exists a whole set of stories an antitrust economist may tell in her court testimony, each 
corresponding to a specific beliefs structure of the competitors, with little if any factual element to 
pick the “right” one for the case at hand. Starting from rough details of the firms’ behavior, AIG 
models yield many potential equilibrium outcomes, with no clear way to choose among them. Thus 
even the most basic antitrust issues have no clear outcome in a Post-Chicago model: anything goes 
in the AIG world!  
The chances that such a world might fare well within the US system of antitrust enforcement – 
little as they already were – have been wiped off by the same Supreme Court which delivered the 
Brooke decision. In the famous Daubert case,111 the Court established the principle that to be 
admitted in court an expert testimony must be not only “relevant”, but also “reliable”. The new 
standard – which applies to any kind of scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, 
including economic knowledge – has significantly restricted the scope for expert testimony, 
entitling courts to a gate-keeping function with respect to the admission of scientific experts.  
The literature about the interpretation and impact of Daubert on US jurisprudence is huge. To our 
aim here, it suffices to note that, according to the Court, an expert testimony may be considered 
“reliable” only if it is scientifically valid, while in order to be “relevant” it must be related to the 
facts of the matter. It follows that, as far as antitrust law is concerned, an economist may be 
admitted in courtroom only if her testimony is such as to, first, provide a scientific theory capable of 
distinguishing between anti- and pro-competitive explanations of the business behavior under 
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scrutiny, and, second, apply the theory to the facts of the case. Given that for the Daubert Court 
science means falsifiability, i.e., the specification and testing of logical hypotheses, it has been 
argued that <<…the Daubert standard provides judges with a useful tool to separate economic 
science from economic fiction.>> (Coate & Fischer 2001, 852).112 
The characterization of expert knowledge provided by Daubert fits well into our reconstruction. 
Among the fields of antitrust law where the underlying economic theory looks prone to fall under a 
Daubert challenge, PP is one of the most notable instances, both in its classic, pre-McGee version 
and in its modern, game-theoretic rendition. This is of considerable import for the current debate in 
antitrust law and economics. As we know, the foundations of the Post-Chicago approach lie in 
modern game theory; hence, a Daubert-based dismissal of the latter on account of its lack of  
“reliability and relevance” would sound ominous for the possibility of Post-Chicago arguments to 
find hearing in – let alone be endorsed by – a US court. On the contrary, the rejection would lend 
support to the Harvard-based skepticism against those economic theories which fail to satisfy the 
requirements of effective applicability by courts and agencies. How can a theory which is either 
unreliable or irrelevant, or both, provide an operational tool for the solution of concrete antitrust 
cases? It follows that the Daubert doctrine may be in tune with Harvard emphasis on operational 
rules and on the limited knowledge and capability of antitrust institutional enforcers, while it 
heralds bad news for Post-Chicago supporters. 
Indeed, according to Coate & Fischer (2001), the Post-Chicago approach, with AIG at its 
foundations, has run into big troubles when faced with a Daubert challenge. While Chicago models 
are, generally speaking, falsifiable, Post-Chicago ones are so specialized in their underlying 
assumptions that they are difficult to test (ibid., 823-4). And even admitting that they may be 
accepted as “reliable science”,  it is even more debatable that they be “relevant” in the Daubert 
sense, i.e., that they are able to produce fact-based outcomes (ibid., 828). The empirical fruitfulness 
of these models is in fact almost nil because their mathematical results only hold when the 
underling assumptions are exactly met. Thus, Post-Chicago models cannot be applied to evaluate 
real world situations: on the one side, the virtual facts upon which they are founded cannot be 
verified in a courtroom; on the other, the real facts in the trial record are of little or no use in 
assessing the models themselves (ibid., 832). The verdict is inevitable: the Daubert standard 
requires courts to reject as mere opinion any expert testimony of this kind.  
As remarked by Coate & Fischer, a series of post-Daubert decisions by lower courts has shown a 
high degree of skepticism against Post-Chicago claims, when no further evidence is provided 
relating the challenged conduct to actual market facts or when those facts are indistinguishable from 
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the results of pro-competitive behavior. It goes without saying that PP is a prominent instance of the 
Post-Chicago difficulties with respect to Daubert challenges, so much so that it is not by chance 
that Coate and Fisher single out BBR’s proposal (see §8) as a perfect example of <<…how a [Post-
Chicago] theory can degenerate into mere opinion…>> (ibid., 835), and thus be doomed under the 
Daubert doctrine. 
The infinite array of outcomes which may possibly arise as equilibria make game-theoretic 
models, and any expert testimony based upon them, inevitably ad hoc. In the specific case of PP, 
notwithstanding the theoretical progress brought by AIG, the observation continues to stand that 
predation theories are so variegated <<…for the same reason that 600 years ago there were a 
thousand positions on what dragons looked like.>> (Easterbrook 1981, 264). This is obviously a 
boon in view of the extreme freedom and flexibility it grants to researchers,113 but is an indictment 
in terms of the actual applicability in courts. A theoretical result which merely points to a possible 
anticompetitive outcome of a given business strategy is insufficient to win the attention of a post-
Daubert court. Indeed, were courts to accept an expert testimony <<… that fails to rise above “mere 
speculation”[114] in  order to infer that a particular market outcome was the result of anticompetitive 
conduct rather than the natural result of the competitive process, the result would be a chilling effect 
on the competitive process.>> (Coate & Fischer 2001, 807, footnote added), i.e., the very kind of 
risk that Matsushita and Brooke tried to avoid. 
 
 
Conclusion: law is not a playground 
 
In a 1989 paper115 MIT economist Franklin Fisher distinguished between generalizing and 
exemplifying theories: the former are those which proceed from wide assumptions to inevitable 
consequences and which speak in terms of what must happen given the background circumstances; 
the latter are those which focus on determining what can happen and are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions used (Fisher 1989, 117). As Fisher himself recognized, oligopoly theory belongs to the 
exemplifying category: a lot of different things may happen in an oligopoly model and there is no 
full theory of what must happen given well-defined, measurable circumstances. Hence, he argued 
oligopoly theory was just a collection of <<…a large number of stories, each one an anecdote 
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describing what might happen in some particular situation.>> (ibid., 118). Fisher added that the 
advent of game theory had only made things worse in this respect, because the only kind of 
generalizing result had been a negative one, namely, the Folk Theorem, which <<…tells us that we 
cannot hope for a general oligopoly theory based only on cost and demand functions and free of the 
context in which oligopolists operate.>> (ibid.). 
In the light of Fisher’s distinction and of our analysis in the previous §§, it turns out that the 
answers to the three basic questions of PP – does it exist theoretically? is it profitable? is it real? 
(see Introduction) – provided by the Post-Chicago, game-theoretic approach are unable to achieve 
the status of a generalizing theory, i.e., of the only kind of theory which may find hearing in a US 
antitrust court, especially after Brooke and Daubert. Thus, we may claim that the real motivation for 
the courtroom failure of strategic models of PP is to be found in the irredeemable inconsistency 
between the exemplifying theories proposed by contemporary IO economists and the kind of 
arguments considered acceptable by judges or juries. No amount of rigorous theorizing showing the 
profitability of predatory behavior, nor the empirical observation of successful predatory episodes 
have managed to modify the legal response to PP, which has remained faithful to the operational 
imperative of a relatively administrable “bright line” rule, provided of course the rule itself be based 
on “relevant and reliable science”. What the Supreme Court did in its 1993 Brooke decision was 
therefore not to provide any sophisticated yardstick for assessing PP, but rather to proclaim the 
inherent difficulty and imprecision of any such assessment, and with it the dubious scientific status 
of any theoretical claim supporting the existence and profitability of predatory behavior. 
It is now customary to place Brooke within the Court’s more general drive, going on throughout 
the 1990s and still continuing today, to “fix the Court’s antitrust” by realigning its doctrine to the 
findings of modern IO.116 According to the standard narrative, the strategic turn of IO, with the rise 
of the Post-Chicago approach, has been the inevitable reaction by those economists who, against the 
courtroom triumph of the laissez faire Chicago approach, employed game theory to rescue and, at 
the same time, strengthen with a more rigorous dressing some of the old Harvard antitrust mantra 
prohibiting several of the most typical behaviors by dominant firms. In this story, the Brooke 
decision would simply be representative of all those courts which still stick to Chicago price theory, 
unaware that this approach has long lost its central status within mainstream economics.  
As I tried to show in the paper, this reconstruction is plausible, but at best incomplete. To begin 
with, asking whether the Brooke Court was following Harvard or Chicago is a false problem – or, if 
you like, a trivial one, since the only correct answer is “both”. This because both approaches entail 
faithfulness to the simple rule-based view of antitrust enforcement in general, and of PP 
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enforcement in particular. It is standard price theory, the common ground of both approaches, 
which imposes adherence to this view. On the contrary, game-theoretic IO points to the opposite 
direction, i.e., away from simple, mechanical rules and back to a story-based assessment of every 
predatory case. Hence, the real dichotomy which need be investigated is not Harvard vs. Chicago, 
but rather rules vs. stories.117 
 Once the terms of the question have been properly identified, it remains to explain why, starting 
from the mid-1970s most US antitrust courts, and chiefly among them the Supreme Court, have 
expressed a clear preference for a rule-based approach to predation cases, thereby killing any 
concrete chance for the game-theoretic methodology to gain any hearing in courtrooms. My bottom 
line is simply that the history of PP law and economics shows that, at the end of the day, it is the 
legal argument – rectius, the legal attitude with respect to a certain way of presenting an argument – 
which prevails, rather than the rigor or elegance of one economic theory or another. To quote from 
Tom (1997, 457): <<The outcomes of particular formal models may be less important than the 
tendency of the game-theoretic perspective to reinforce the litigator’s traditional emphasis on “the 
story” at the expense of the appellate judge’s traditional emphasis on “the rule”.>>, and it goes 
without saying which of the two emphases is destined to prevail in courtrooms. 
As to the reason why courts may prefer simple rules to more flexible, but also more complicated, 
stories, it is apt to go back to Breyer’s 1990 dictum in Town of Concord: <<We shall take into 
account of the institutional fact that antitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear 
enough for lawyers to explain them to clients. They must be administratively workable and 
therefore cannot always take account of every complex economic circumstance or qualification.>> 
(Town of Concord, at 22). The price for being consistent with such an obvious truth has been that, 
as an authoritative commentator and former FTC associate director put it, <<[i]n the one area in 
which economists’ game-theoretic approaches seemingly offered new possibilities for plaintiff 
victories – predatory pricing – the post-Chicago approach has failed to deliver.>> (McChesney 
2004, 51). A very low price, at least for antitrust judges and juries. Indeed so low that it has allowed 
the Chicago predator to defend its leadership in the US courtroom “market” at the expense of post-
Chicago preys.  
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